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WHAT'S WRONG WITH A 
FEDERAL INHERITANCE TAX? 
Wendy C. Gerzog* 
Synopsis: Scholars have proposed a federal inheritance tax as an 
alternative to the current federal transfer taxes, but that proposal is 
seriously flawed. In any inheritance tax model, scholars should expect to see 
significantly decreased compliance rates and increased administrative costs 
because, by focusing on the transferees instead of on the transferor, an 
inheritance tax would multiply the number of taxpayers subject to the tax. 
This Article reviews common characteristics of existing inheritance 
tax systems in the United States and internationally-particularly in 
Europe. In addition, the Article analyzes the novel Comprehensive 
Inheritance Tax (CIT) proposal, which combines some elements of 
existing inheritance tax systems with some features of the current transfer 
tax system and delivers the CIT through the federal income tax system. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Periodically, scholars have proposed alternatives to the current federal 
transfer tax system. l One of those proposals has been for the United States 
* Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law. The author wishes to thank 
Professors Mary Louise Fellows, Anthony Infanti, Kerry Ryan, Jane Schukoske, Theodore 
Seto, and the participants at the following conferences for their very helpful comments: The 
Association of American Law Schools' 2012 Annual Meeting in Washington, D.C.; 2012 
Critical Tax Conference at Seton Hall Law School; 2013 Law and Society Annual Meeting 
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to adopt a federal inheritance tax. In fact, for 4 years the United States had a 
federal inheritance tax to fmance the Spanish American War, but after the 
war in 1902 the inheritance tax was abolished.2 Although positive aspects of 
an inheritance tax exist, equity and compliance issues ultimately would 
plague and undermine that alternative tax. 
A fundamental problem with existing inheritance tax systems is their 
basing tax rates on a decedent's relation to a beneficiary.3 This emphasis is 
objectionable on fairness considerations. Why should the familial identity of 
the beneficiary matter? What public policy concerns are fostered by 
in Boston, Massachusetts, Tax Law and Society 12: Taxing Wealth Transfers (session 
sponsored by the Law, Society, and Taxation Collaborative Research Network). The author 
also thanks her research assistant, Brooke Shemer, for helping edit this Article. 
1 The federal transfer taxes include the gift, estate, and generation-skipping transfer taxes. 
See JOSEPH M. DODGE, WENDY C. GERZOG & BRIDGET J. CRAWFORD, FEDERAL TAXATION ON 
GRATUITOUS TRANSFERS: LAW AND PLANNING 31-60 (2011). See generally Alternatives to the 
Current Federal Estate Tax System: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 110th Congo 
1017 (2008) [hereinafter 2008 Hearings on Alternatives] (statements of Lily Batchelder, 
Professor, New York University School of Law; Joseph M. Dodge, Professor, Florida State 
University College of Law; and David Duff, Professor, University of Toronto Faculty of Law). 
See also id. at 76 (statement of Professor Joseph M. Dodge) ("There are five possible 
alternatives to the current estate, gift, and generation-skipping system: (l) classic inheritance 
tax, (2) accessions tax, (3) income-inclusion approach, (4) deemed-realization-at-gift-or-
bequest-approach, and (5) carryover-basis approach."); Joseph M. Dodge, Joseph Kartiganer & 
Sherwin Kamin, Alternatives to the Current Federal Wealth Transfer Tax System, in Tax Force 
on Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes, Report on Reform of Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes, 58 
TAX LAW. 93, 279-312 app. A (2004). 
2 See STANLEYS. SURREY,PAULR. McDANIEL & HARRy L. GUTMAN,FEDERAL WEALTH 
TRANSFER TAXATION 3 (rev. 2d ed. 1987). Originally enacted in 1898 as a combination estate 
and inheritance tax, the federal inheritance tax morphed into a tax with a rate that "graduated 
according to the relationship of the beneficiaries and heirs to the decedent." Id. See generally 
Knowlton V. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900) (upholding the constitutionality ofthe statute, but 
construing it as applying rates relative to the beneficiaries and heirs, and not relative to the 
decedent's total estate). 
3 See 2008 Hearings on Alternatives, supra note I, at 77 (statement of Professor Joseph 
M. Dodge) ("An inheritance tax distorts bequest choices by creating tax incentives in favor 
of certain classes oflegatees. An inheritance tax also creates an incentive for the dispersion 
of wealth among legatees, but such an incentive isn't especially needed in contemporary 
American legal practice and culture, which has generally abandoned primogeniture."); 
Gerald Jantscher, Aims of Death Taxation, in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY (Edward 
Halbach ed., 1977), excerpted in FEDERAL TAXATION ON GRATUITOUS TRANSFERS: LAW AND 
PLANNING, supra note 1, at 23, 26 ("One ofthe most common features ofthe inheritance tax 
is the graduation of rates according to the relationship between the decedent and the 
recipient."). The U.S. inheritance tax during the Spanish-American War included graduated 
rates based on family relationships. See SURREY, McDANIEL & GUTMAN, supra note 2. 
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preferring either closely related or unrelated recipients? With the possible 
exceptions for a surviving spouse who may have shared in acquiring the 
decedent's property, or for minor children whom the decedent was required 
to support in life, is not the identity of a beneficiary an inherently personal 
and private matter? Should the law encourage the passage of wealth to only 
certain beneficiaries?4 
Apart from their charitable gifts,S most wealthy decedents leave their 
property to other wealthy individuals,6 and the maj ority of beneficiaries are 
the decedent's close relatives.7 For the comparatively few estates with non-
relative heirs, no policy rationale supports subjecting those few unrelated 
individuals to either a higher or a lower tax rate. Although some scholars 
have supported lower rates for gratuitous transfers to more distant or 
unrelated beneficiaries on the basis that these transfers encourage the 
redistribution of wealth, the goal of "breaking up large estates" more 
logically refers to taxing wealthy decedents' estates so as to produce 
additional revenue that will either pass to the government to spend for the 
4 While the genetic evolution theory-proposing a primal urge to protect one's lineal 
descendents-may explain giving a preference to passing wealth to one's lineal descendents, 
the goal of equity from a tax policy standpoint does not similarly require basing a tax system 
on that rationale. See Theodore P. Seto, Intergenerational Decision Making: An Evolutionary 
Perspective, 35 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 235, 265 (2001). Professor Seto described the biological 
concept of kin selection: 
Id. 
Its relevant premise, however, is that we are motivated to care about 
others because we share genes with them. If this premise is carried to its 
logical conclusion, the strength of our motivation to care should depend 
on the extent to which we share genes. Thus, we should care more about 
our children than about our cousins, more about our cousins than about 
strangers, and more about strangers than about nonhumans. 
S See infra Part II.D. 
6 See Aviva Aron-Dine, Commentary, Trade-Offs in Choosing Between an Estate Tax 
and an Inheritance Tax, 63 TAX L. REv. 265, 266 (2009) ("Thus, the effect is likely to be on 
the distribution of wealth among the very wealthy. I do not thi.nk we can reasonably expect 
much effect on inequality between the top and the bottom, or the top and the middle."). 
7 With either a transfer tax or an inheritance tax that provides large exemptions, the 
recipient's basic needs-in relation to the general population-are much more than 
adequately met. See Anne L. Alstott, Commentary, Family Values, Inheritance Law, and 
Inheritance Taxation, 63 TAX L. REv. 123, 128-29 (2009); Lily L. Batchelder, What Should 
Society Expectfrom Heirs? The Casefor a Comprehensive Inheritance Tax, 63 TAX L. REv. 
1,16 (2009); Michael Udell, Commentary, Wealth Transfer Taxes: Benefits, Burdens, and 
Bases, 63 TAX L. REv. 215, 218 (2009). 
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"public good" or will result in marginally8 lower taxes on the working poor 
and middle class. A system that distinguishes tax rates based on a fairly 
small number of the beneficiaries, or on a distant familial relationship (or 
lack thereof) ofthe decedent's beneficiaries, cannot realistically achieve the 
reduction of concentrated family wealth and its associated power.9 
Another major problem with a pure inheritance tax system is that it 
lacks the back up of a gift tax on inter vivos transfers. lo To respond to this 
problem, some countries have implemented gift taxes. II Six states in the 
United States have enacted an inheritance tax, 12 but only two states impose 
8 The revenue from taxes on wealth transfers is not likely to result in significant tax 
reductions for lower bracket taxpayers because, with large exemptions, relatively fewer 
taxpayers are in the taxing pool. See DODGE, GERZOG & CRAWFORD, supra note I, at 24; 
MichaeIJ. Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, NottoBurylt, 93 Y ALEL.J. 259, 269-70 (1983). 
9 See Louis Kaplow, On the Taxation of Private Transfers, 63 TAX L. REv. 159, 178 
(2009) ("[B]equests would to an extent be random windfalls and thus might be subjected to 
confiscatory taxation and redistribution, the former not having any behavioral effect."); see 
also STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, I 10TH CONG., DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF 
ALTERNATIVE WEALTH TRANSFER TAX SYSTEMS 17 (Comm. Print 2008) [hereinafter 2008 
JOINT COMMITTEE PRINT], available at https:llwww.jct.gov/publications.html?func=fileinfo 
&id=1318 ("Studies have found that more than two-thirds of testate decedents with 
multi child families divide their estates exactly equally or very close to equally. "). Yet, equal 
division of very large estates means that each child receives a very large windfall, and that 
family wealth is still family wealth. 
10 See United States v. Irvine, 5 11 U.S. 224, 234 (1994); Smith v. Shaughnessy, 3 I 8 
U.S. 176, 179 (1943) (supplementing the estate tax with the gift tax); Estate of Sanford v. 
Comm'r, 308 U.S. 39,44 (1939); DODGE, GERZOG & CRAWFORD, supra note I, at 35. 
II See 2008 JOINT COMMITTEE PRINT, 1 10TH CONGo at 7-9 (Finland, Germany, Ireland, 
and Spain). 
12 See IOWA CODE § 450.3 (2014); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 140.010 (LexisNexis201O); 
MD. CODE ANN., TAX-GEN. § 7-2 (LexisNexis 2010); NEB. REv. STAT. § 77-2001 (2013); 
N.J. REv. STAT. § 54:5-1 (2014); 72 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9116 (West 2000 & Supp. 
2013). Since 1989, Tennessee's inheritance tax (although the state nominally retained the 
tax) has not made distinctions on rates or exemptions because ofthe beneficiaries relation to 
the decedent, and its progressive rates are dependent on the estate's value, ranging from 
5.5%-9.5%. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 67-8-314(a), -8-316(a)(2) (2013). Because the tax 
more closely resembles an estate tax, Tennessee is not included as a state with an inheritance 
tax. Tennessee repealed its "inheritance" tax for decedents dying after 20 I 6. See id. § 67-8-
3l4(b). Indiana recently repealed its inheritance tax for decedents dying on or after January 
1,2013. See IND. CODE ANN. § 6-4.I-Il-2 (LexisNexis 2007) (repealed 2013). Likewise, in 
20 I 2, Oregon eliminated its inheritance tax and substituted a state estate tax that is applicable 
to decedents dying on or after January 1,2012. See Estate and Trust Taxes, OR. DEP'T OF 
REVENUE, www.oregon.gov/dorlbusipagesiinheritance.aspx (last visited Mar. 31, 20 I 4). 
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a gift tax and those states-Connecticut and Minnesota 13 --do not have an 
inheritance tax (although they do have a state estate tax).14 Some states, 
however, do include some lifetime transfers in their inheritance tax regimes, 
but outright gifts that are not in contemplation of death or within a few 
years of death are not subject to any state inheritance tax. 15 Thus the very 
wealthiest of individuals who have many times the funds necessary to 
maintain a high standard ofliving and cover their unexpected expenses are 
most able to avoid an inheritance tax through early lifetime gifts. 16 
Compounding this problem is that inheritance taxes do not generally 
apply to gifts over which the decedent retained control until, or shortly before, 
his death despite that those transfers may well be described as testamentary. 
Hence, wealthy individuals are able to avoid the tax as they are more likely to 
make lifetime transfers when they can retain control over the transferred 
property during their lifetimes. More so, the exemption from inheritance tax 
systems of lifetime gifts with retained powers contrasts sharply to the 
inclusion of such transfers under the current estate tax provisions-Internal 
13 See Judith Lohman, CONN. GEN . ASSEMBLY, OFFICE OF LEGIS. REsEARCH, LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE CONNECTICUT ESTATE TAX SINCE 2001 (2010), available at cga.ct.govI20 1 0/ 
rpt/2010-R-0226.htm ("In 2005, Connecticut revamped its taxes on inheritances and gifts. It 
repealed the succession tax, which it was already phasing out, and it combined the state estate 
and gift taxes into one transfer tax with the same rates. "). The Connecticut gift and estate taxes 
replicate their federal transfer tax counterparts but with lower exemption levels and rates (total 
of$2 million gift or estate exemption and maximum rate of 12%). See id at tbl.5. Connecticut's 
succession tax was a typical inheritance tax: "Whether the tax applied and at what tax rate 
depended not only on the value of the inheritance but also on the relationship of the heirs to the 
decedent." Id. The tax system provided four classes of heirs with the lowest rates applicable to a 
decedent's closest relatives and the highest rates for the decedent's distant relatives and 
unrelated persons. See id Recently, in its 2013 Omnibus Tax Act, Minnesota enacted a state 
gift tax effective for gifts made after June 30, 2013. SeeH.R. 677, 2013 Leg., 88th Sess. (Minn. 
2013) (subjecting the excess of$1 million in aggregate lifetime and testamentary transfers to its 
state transfer taxes). The purpose of enacting the state gift tax was ''to complement or back up 
the Minnesota estate tax." ANN LENCZEWSKl, HOUSE RESEARCH BILL SUMMARY, H.F. 2013-
677, 88th Sess., at 28 (2013) (Conf. Rep.), available at http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/ 
hrd/bS/881HF0677 .pdf. 
14 Tennessee, which has a nominal inheritance tax, recently repealed its state gift tax for 
gifts made on or after January 1,2012. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-8-101 (a)(2). Kentucky has 
not had a state estate tax since January 1,2005. See Ky. DEP'T OF REVENUE, A GUIDE TO 
KENTUCKY INHERITANCE AND ESTATE TAXES: GENERAL INFORMATION 2 (2011), available at 
http://revenue.ky. gov INRIrdonIyres/6D844 DC9-B300-4 EE 7 -963 E-D B 141 FCOAED6/0/ 
guide_20II.pdf. 
15 See discussion infra Part II.A. 
16 See discussion infra Part II.A. 
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Revenue Code (Code) sections 2036 and 2038. Those provisions require the 
application of estate taxation to transfers with retained control, and in so 
doing, they function as important anti-abuse mechanisms. 
Because many state inheritance tax systems depend heavily on the 
current transfer tax system for pivotal definitions, any new system would 
likely need to borrow or replicate much of the law and language of the 
current transfer tax system. 17 Specifically, various state inheritance tax 
statutes use federal law definitions to determine marital and charitable 
deductions qualifications. 18 Likewise, at least one state statute cites to the 
federal gift tax annual exclusion and spousal-gift-splitting statutes)9 
The thorniest questions and abuses in the transfer tax area involve 
valuation distortion.20 For the most part, those difficulties would not 
disappear with an inheritance tax and would resurface in that alternative tax 
system. 21 Additionally, in an inheritance tax regime, fractional interest 
discounts would proliferate.22 With any of the recent proposals23 that are 
17 See, e.g., Batchelder, supra note 7, at 65 ("Despite this fundamental change in the 
form of wealth transfer taxation, the proposal would continue to rely on much of the 
extensive body oflaws, regulations, and guidance that have been developed under the U.S. 
estate tax system. For example, the existing rules governing when a transfer has occurred, 
how it is valued, and what transfers are taxable would remain unchanged. The proposal 
would not tax a large portion of wealth transfers, as under current law."). Moreover, 
Professor Batchelder states: "To the extent that the current tax treatment of accrued gains, 
generation-skipping transfers, income in respect of a decedent, illiquid assets, charitable 
contributions, and gifts made during life for education and medical expenses are considered 
desirable or politically necessary, these exemptions could be maintained." Id. 
18 See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 450.3(7)(a) (2014) (referencing the federal qualified 
terminable interest property (QTIP) under Code section 2056(b)(7)(B». 
19 See id. § 450.3(2) (citing both the exclusions "under section 2503, subsections (b) 
and (e), ofthe Internal Revenue Code" and to gift splitting as allowed "in section 2513 of the 
Internal Revenue Code"). 
20 See, e.g., Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, Commentary, Family Limited 
Partnerships: Discounts, Options, and Disappearing Value, 6 FLA. TAX REv. 649 (2004); Mary 
Louise Fellows & William H. Painter, Valuing Close Corporations for Federal Wealth 
Transfer Taxes: A Statutory Solution to the Disappearing Wealth Syndrome, 30 STAN. L. REv. 
895 (1978); Wendy C. Gerzog, Valuation Discounting Techniques: Terms GoneAwry, 61 TAX 
LAW. 775 (2008); Brant 1. Hellwig, On Discounted Partnership Interests and Adequate 
ConSideration, 28 V A. TAX REv. 531 (2009); James R. Repetti, Minority Discounts: The 
Alchemy in Estate and Gift Taxation, 50 TAX L. REv. 415 (1995); Walter D. Schwidetzky, 
Family Limited Partnerships: The Beat Goes On, 60 TAX LAW. 277 (2007). 
21 See infra Part V. 
22 See 2008 JOINT COMMITIEE PRINT, I 10TH CONGo 22 (Comm. Print), available at 
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=fileinfo&id=1318. 
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offered as substitutes for the present transfer tax system, property values 
would still need to reflect fair market value accurately; and in any system 
(including the current transfer tax system) valuation reform would need to 
occur?4 
In 2009, Professor Lily Batchelder made an innovative proposal to 
create a comprehensive inheritance tax (CIT) to replace the current transfer 
tax system and to tax large gifts and bequests as income.25 She incorporates 
from existing inheritance tax systems the focus on the recipient of a gift or 
bequest because, as her data shows,26 the burden of the estate tax falls 
mainly on the beneficiary.27 According to her, approximately one-fifth of 
the recipients bear a disproportionate weight under the current transfer taX.28 
23 See id. at 2--4. Scholars have proposed alternatives such as a deemed-realization 
approach, an inheritance tax, an accessions tax, an income-inclusion tax, and various hybrid 
approaches. See DODGE, GERZOG & CRAWFORD, supra note 1, at 22-23; Joseph M. Dodge, A 
Deemed Realization Approach Is Superior to Carryover Basis (and Avoids Most of the 
Problems of the Estate and Gift Tax), 54 TAX L. REv. 421 (2001); Joseph M. Dodge, Beyond 
Estate and Gift Tax Reform: Including Gifts and Bequests in Income, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1177 
(1978); Joseph M. Dodge, Comparing a Reformed Estate Tax with an Accessions Tax and an 
Income-Inclusion System, and Abandoning the Generation-Skipping Tax, 56 SMU L. REv. 
551 (2003); Joseph M. Dodge, Taxing Gratuitous Transfers Under a Consumption Tax, 51 
TAX L. REv. 529 (1996). 
24 See 2008 JOINT COMMITTEE PRINT, 11 OTH CONGo at 22 ( citing STAFF OF J. COMM. ON 
TAXATION, OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES, JCS-
02-05, at 396--404 (2005)) (proposing rules that would limit the use of minority and 
marketability discounts under the present U.S. estate and gift tax system). 
25 See Batchelder, supra note 7. The CIT is a proposed replacement for the current 
transfer tax system that is integrated into the current income tax system and has features of a 
cumulative accessions tax. See id. at 62--64. Each recipient of gifts and inheritances 
exceeding $1.9 million (plus $13,000 annual gifts and $65,000 in annual bequests) must 
include those amounts in income at the beneficiary's tax bracket plus an additional 5% 
surtax. See id. Bequests, like gifts currently, would receive a carryover basis. See id. 
Professor Batchelder outlined a detailed explanation ofthe CIT tax treatment of a multitude 
of assets and transfers. See id. This Article's discussion of the CIT is highly abbreviated, but 
it includes a discussion of the CIT as the sole proposed, rather than actual, inheritance tax 
because of its significant addition to the scholarship on this topic. See 2008 JOINT 
COMMITTEE PRINT, 1 10TH CONGo at 14. 
26 Batchelder, supra note 7, at 4 ("In addition, none has maintained that wealth transfer 
taxes predominantly burden heirs, or provided estimates of the distributional effects of 
wealth transfer taxes at an heir level. "). 
27 However, the actual beneficiary with the burden of taxation depends upon how the 
decedent allocated that burden in his or her will or trust documents. Without a clear directive 
from the decedent, federal statutory presumptions-like those in sections 2205, 2206, 2207, 
2207 A, and 2207B-apply, or state apportionment rules control. That is, in fact, only one 
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Professor Batchelder correctly points to the inequity between the 
wealthy and less wealthy beneficiaries;29 however, her numbers do not 
explain to what extent this onus is the result of the decedent's design, or is 
the result of the applicable apportionment statute, or is the consequence of a 
lack of progressivity in our current flat transfer tax rate or an estate planning 
technique. Primarily, the decedent controls the assignment of any tax and 
debt burden among his beneficiaries. Those costs may be assigned equitably 
or unevenly distributed among heirs. For example, a decedent with two 
children can shift the tax burden to his wealthier child. Even understanding 
that an equal division may unfairly burden his poorer child, the decedent 
may still opt not to shift the tax burden or not to divide his property 
unevenly to offset this effect. The decedent may, for example, simply want 
to reward his more successful child who is more like himself. Thus the 
decedent may think that he is being fair: Each child receives an equal 
amount. If that equal division results in one child shouldering more of the 
expense, that may be the parent's choice. 
If a decedent is silent or unclear on the issue of tax and debt burden 
apportionment in his will or trust instrument, federal tax reimbursement 
statutes or state apportionment laws may control which beneficiaries must 
bear the expense, and that result may be equitable (that is, to the extent that 
the transferred property incurs a tax) or inequitable (like in burden-on-the-
heir (under a burden-of-the-residue-testamentary provision or state fallback rule) may have 
that burden despite other heirs being recipients of taxable estate assets. 
28 See 2008 Hearings on Alternatives, supra note 1, at 32 app. (statement of Professor 
Lily Batchelder) ("As Table 1 shows, in 2009 only about 5 in 1,000 people who receive an 
inheritance will bear any estate tax burden. In part, this is because more than 30 percent of 
heirs inheriting between $2.5 and $5 million are not burdened by the estate tax at all. 
Generally these heirs have inherited all or part of an estate just below the exemption 
threshold. Meanwhile about 4 percent of those inheriting between $500,000 and $1 million 
are burdened by the estate tax, often at quite high rates. Typically these heirs have inherited a 
much smaller amount from an even larger estate."); Batchelder, supra note 7, at 3 ("Surachai 
Khitatrakun and I estimate that about 22% of heirs burdened by the U.S. estate tax have 
inherited less than $500,000, while 21 % of heirs who inherit more than $2,500,000 bear no 
estate tax burden."). 
29 See Batchelder, supra note 7, at 69 ("In aggregate, the distributional effects of the 
proposal are fairly similar to the estate tax system. As illustrated by Figures 15 and 16, the 
proposal is somewhat more progressive by economic income and inheritance size, but the 
differences are not dramatic. Heirs with economic income of less than $500,000 or 
inheritances below $2.5 million bear higher average tax rates under the estate tax. 
Meanwhile, those with economic income or inheritances exceeding these amounts bear 
higher burdens under the [CIT] proposal."); see also infra Part III. 
SPRING 2014 Federal Inheritance Tax 171 
residue jurisdictions). 30 Thus, other federal tax statutes or state law may at 
least, to some extent, control the inequity Professor Batchelder finds. Those 
laws are fallback provisions that come into effect when a decedent does not 
specifically state which beneficiaries will bear the tax responsibility. 
Finally, when there are insufficient burdened assets to cover the decedent's 
liabilities, the government will pursue its debt either from the execut021 or 
from any and all beneficiaries to the extent of the value of the property 
those beneficiaries receive from the estate.32 
Notably, by means of an irrevocable life insurance trust (ILIT}-a 
common estate planning technique-the decedent can effectively fmance the 
costs of estate taxes at a significant discount both to the decedent and to his or 
her family.33 That is, the proceeds oflife insurance on the decedent's life are 
not included in the decedent's estate when the policy is owned solely by the 
ILIT (and not transferred by the decedent to the ILIT within 3 years of his 
death) even if the decedent paid the insurance premiums.34 Yet, the decedent 
can use the untaxed proceeds to provide additional funds and liquidity for his 
estate. So, to some extent, often neither the decedent nor the beneficiaries has 
the burden of paying a significant portion of the estate tax bill.35 
An ILIT is often incorporated into an estate plan in second marriages 
when an age disparity exists between the spouses and the older spouse has 
adult children from an earlier marriage who are similar in age to the 
younger spouse. When the older spouse dies, he may leave funds to those 
children through an ILIT.36 However, because the proceeds of an ILIT are 
30 See Wendy C. Gerzog, Equitable Apportionment: Recent Cases and Continuing 
Trends, 41 REAL PROP. PROB. & Th. J. 671, 672-79 (2007). 
31 The executor must pay the taxes before distributing the property to beneficiaries or he 
may be responsible for that expense. See I.R.C. § 6901(a); 31 U.S.C. § 3713(b) (2006). 
Pursuant to sections 2204(a) and 6905(a), executors can limit their liability by filing the 
appropriate tax returns and then filing an application (Form 5495). 
32 See I.R.C. § 6324(a)(2). Under this statute, an individual beneficiary may be liable, 
even for estate taxes relating to another beneficiary's property, up to the amount of property 
that the individual has received from the estate. See id. 
33 See infra note 85 and accompanying text. 
34 See id. 
35 See id. Thus, Professor Batchelder's statistics do not reflect how much of the 22% are 
so burdened because of the current transfer tax system and not because of other factors such 
as the decedent's design or the effect of other laws; therefore, the inequity she finds may be 
less than her figures suggest. 
36 See, e.g., Richard E. Barnes, Till Death Do Us Part (Again), PROB. & PROP., 
MarchiApril2007, at 34, 36 rWhen appropriate, a large outright distribution, an irrevocable 
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not subject to estate tax, those bequests would not be a part of Professor 
Batchelder's data. 
Moreover, Professor Batchelder's information may simply argue for re-
instituting a more progressive rate structure into the current flat transfer tax 
rates.37 The heirs most burdened are likely to be the ones whose deceased 
parent or relative is at the margins of taxability in the current transfer tax 
system and not those heirs of the mega-rich who are each likely to be well-
off. Currently, the flat transfer tax rate is 40%38 in contrast to the 
progressive rates in effect prior to the Tax Act of2001, which ranged from 
37% to 55%.39 Especially with the current larger exemptions ($5.34 million 
combined estate and gift tax exemption in 2014 compared to the $1 million 
gift tax and the $3.5 million aggregate transfer tax exemption in 2009 when 
Professor Batchelder published her CIT proposal),40 the skewed burden 
Professor Batchelder addresses more likely affects a smaller minority of 
life insurance trust naming the children as beneficiaries, or a QTIP trust capped at a fraction of 
the estate may provide funds for the children immediately while still providing for the surviving 
spouse and lessening the animosity between the children and the younger spouse."). 
37 See 2008 Hearings on Alternatives, supra note I, at 3 (statement of Professor Lily 
Batchelder) ("Some people receiving relatively modest bequests may bear a substantial tax 
burden ifthey are inheriting from an extremely large estate, and some people receiving really 
extraordinarily large inheritances may bear no estate tax burden ifthey are receiving from one 
or more estates that are just below the lifetime exemption."). Professor Batchelder illustrates the 
tax burden disparity by comparing those estates below the exemption amount (and therefore not 
taxed under the current transfer tax system) with taxable estates in which heirs receive 
relatively small inheritances. Her point is well-argued and supported, though her data reflects 
that the vast majority of recipients do not have this problem. Her data, moreover, does not 
consider the decedent's intentions nor federal reimbursement statutes and state apportionment 
laws' roles in placing the burden on the beneficiary. Likewise, the 22% figure might well be 
further reduced by the re-imposition of more progressive rates for those estates just over the 
exemption amount. See discussion infra Part III. With the increased exemption of $5.34 
million, moreover, that figure for unfairly burdened heirs might already be substantially 
decreased. See infra note 40 and accompanying text. Finally, more data needs to be collected 
about how many nonstudent adult heirs are in the lower income tax brackets. 
38 See American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. 112-240, 126 Stat. 2313, 
§ 101(c)(I) (Jan. 2, 2013) (codified as amended at 1.R.c.§ 2001 (c)). 
39 See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 107THCONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX 
LEGISLATION 57-58 (Comm. Print 2003) [hereinafter 2001 ACT EXPLANATION]; see also 
RONALDD. AUCUTI, ESTATE TAX CHANGES PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 6 (2014), available 
at http://www.mcguirewoods.comlnews-resources/publications/estate-tax-changes.pdf 
40 See AUCUTI, supra note 39; What's New- Estate and Gift Tax, IRS, http://www.irs. 
gov lBusinesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-EmployedlWhats-N ew-Estate-and-Gift-Tax (last 
updated Apr. 9,2014); see also DODGE, GERZOG & CRAWFORD, supra note I, at 55-58. 
SPRING 2014 Federal Inheritance Tax 173 
heirs today. Also, those facts may point to a simpler solution than instituting 
a completely new tax like an inheritance tax or the CIT. 
Some scholars, including Professor Batchelder,41 have argued on 
redistribution grounds that tax preferences should be given to decedents 
who pass property to less wealthy distant relatives or unrelated 
individuals.42 Indeed, the feature ofthe CIT that emphasizes the relationship 
between the transferor and the transferee is one that underlines its identity 
as a type of inheritance tax rather than as a pure income-inclusion system. 
However, a tax preference for remotely related or unrelated recipients of the 
decedent's wealth does not and cannot equate with the goal of "breaking up 
large estates," a purported objective of the transfer tax system.43 Decedents 
41 See Batchelder, supra note 7, at 69 ("In reality, the proposal would probably be even 
more progressive than the current system because these estimates assume no behavioral 
response. To the extent that donors respond to the incentives created by the proposal to give 
more widely and to those with less pre-inheritance income, pretax inheritances should 
become more progressive .... [T]here is little, ifany, evidence on which to base an estimate 
of this response."). 
42 See Anne L. Alstott, Equal Opportunity and Inheritance Taxation, 121 HARv. L. 
REv. 469, 511 (2007) ("With these principles in place, we can now see that the equal 
opportunity perspective suggests a striking departure from the European inheritance tax 
model and from prior proposals for accessions taxation. Instead oftaxing gifts and bequests 
from closer relatives at lower rates, the inheritance tax should tax bequests from relatives in 
full and should exempt those from nonrelatives."). However, Professor Alstott acknowledged 
not only are those transfers unusual but they might also encourage abuse: "Gifts and bequests 
from unrelated individuals are rare today, but the danger is that they might become the 
newest shelter for the rich." Id. at 512. 
43 See, e.g., Jantscher, supra note 3, at 23-27. Besides countering the concentration of 
economic and political power in the wealthiest individuals and families, stated rationales for 
taxing wealth transfers include increasing revenue, equalizing opportunity, encouraging 
additional income tax progressivity, and a backstop to the income tax regime. See, e.g., 
Wojciech Kopczuk, Economics of Estate Taxation: Review of Theory and Evidence, 63 TAX 
L. REv. 139, 152 (2009) ("Suppose that high wealth concentration has a negative effect on 
the welfare of the society. If this is the case, then the targeting principle would call for a tax 
hitting wealth concentration. The current estate tax is precisely that kind of a tax: It affects 
only those with high wealth. Why might one think that wealth concentration is undesirable? 
For one thing, some of the world's worst-governed countries exhibit a high concentration of 
wealth. While correlation does not imply causality, it is at least consistent with the notion 
that a concentration of wealth, that is, the situation in which some individuals are big relative 
to the state, has an adverse effect on the political process or constitutes a danger to 
democracy. This was one of the main arguments used when the estate tax was introduced in 
the United States."); Thomas Nagel, Liberal Democracy and Hereditary Inequality, 63 TAX 
L. REv. 113, 117-18 (2009) ("If contemporary fortunes are not whittled down by inheritance 
taxes and the donations to charity that such taxes encourage, we will find ourselves with a 
greatly enlarged long-term dynastic upper class ofinordinate wealth .... A dynastic system 
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generally give their assets to relatively few loved ones.44 Indeed, despite 
claims by those who expect that an inheritance tax would change a 
decedent's behavior increasing the number of beneficiaries to whom a 
decedent would pass her property, some evidence shows that this logical 
result would not occur.45 
Finally and most haltingly, focusing on beneficiaries rather than on the 
decedent multiplies the number of taxpayers involved in reporting 
transactions that are inherently difficult to police. Our history with 
unreported tip income when third parties are usually involved, should 
provide a warning of the difficulty of enforcement in the area of family 
gifts.46 Compliance rates would decrease significantly under an income-
inclusion or CIT system, and administrative costs would increase. 
The purpose of this Article is to identify and critique common 
characteristics of the inheritance tax systems that exist in the United States 
and internationally, particularly in Europe, using the current-albeit 
imperfect-federal transfer tax system as a benchmark. In addition, the 
Article examines the novel CIT proposal offered by Professor Batchelder 
that takes some elements of existing inheritance taxes as well as some 
that is allowed simply to float free of societal control is not merely a form of economic 
inequality, but a form of exemption of members of the privileged class from the minimal 
conditions of social solidarity."); see also 2008 JOINT COMMITTEE PRINT, 11 OTH CONGo 1-2 
(Comm. Print), available at https;//www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=fileinfo&id=1318. 
For arguments in favor of a high exemption to retain the positive attributes offamily wealth, 
see Nagel, supra at 120. 
44 See Kopczuk, supra note 43, at 141 ("Interpersonal externalities should not be 
ignored in a debate about transfers, but their relevance, in my view, is potentially important 
only when we are considering transfers throughout the distribution, rather than transfers at 
the top of the distribution, as is the case in the context of the current transfer taxation in the 
United States."). Despite having hundreds or even thousands of Facebook friends, most 
decedents have very few people they want to give or leave their property to, and most of 
those beneficiaries are in the same socio-economic stratum as the decedents. 
45 Data indicates that the wealthy do not take advantage of certain transfer tax benefits 
because of stronger motivational reasons such as fear of insufficient assets later in life or, 
more significantly, a desire to retain control over those who will likely be their ultimate 
beneficiaries. See infra text and accompanying notes 131-136. Also, parents most likely 
would still make most of their gifts and bequests to their children. See Kaplow, supra note 9, 
at 175 ("[M]ost gifts are to relatives, the largest being from parents to children."). Perhaps 
the genetic evolution theory may also support the proposition that such an upside down 
principle would never be enacted in the first place. See Seto, supra note 4. 
46 See John Robertson, Tina Quinn & Rebecca C. Carr, Unreported Tip Income: A 
Taxing Issue, CPA JOURNAL (Dec. 2006), available at http;//www.nysscpa.orglcpajournaV 
2006/1206/essentials/p30.htm. 
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features of the current transfer tax system and embeds them into the income 
tax system. 
II. EXISTING INHERITANCE TAX SYSTEMS 
A. Inter Vivos Transfers 
Just as the U.S. gift tax was enacted to supplement and prevent erosion 
of the estate tax,47 many international inheritance taxes include some kind 
of taxation on gifts.48 For example, Germany, Ireland, Spain, and Finland 
subject gifts over an exemption amount either to a gift tax or to an 
inheritance tax.49 Currently only six states in the United States impose an 
inheritance tax,50 and none of those states also impose a state gift tax, 
although five states with an inheritance tax also have a state estate tax51 and 
two states with an inheritance tax also have a state generation-skipping 
transfer (GST) tax.52 Some states with inheritance taxes include gifts 
47 
See SURREY, McDANIEL & GUTMAN, supra note 2, at 4 ("As soon as the estate tax 
became law, wealthy persons sought to avoid its provisions by transferring their property 
before death."). 
48 See 2008 Hearings on Alternatives, supra note 1, at 77 (statement of Professor 
Joseph M. Dodge) ("Finally, it is hard to integrate a gift tax with an inheritance tax."). Most 
often, an inheritance tax is an annual tax on gratuitous receipts. See 2008 JOINT COMMITTEE 
PRINT, I 10TH CONGo at 7, n.21. 
49 See id. at 8-9. 
50 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
51 See IOWA CODE §§ 451.2,451.4 (2014); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 140.130(LexisNexis 
2010); MD. CODE ANN., TAX-GEN. § 7-302 (LexisNexis 2010); N.J. REv. STAT. § 54:38-1 
(2014); 72 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9117 (West 2000 & Supp. 2013); see also IND. CODE 
ANN. §§ 6-4.1-11-1, -11-2 (LexisNexis 2007) (repealed for decedents dying on or after 
January 1,2013). 
52 See IOWA CODE § 450A.2; MD. CODE ANN., TAX-GEN. § 7-402(6)(imposing a tax on 
GSTs that are not a "direct skip" under section 2612 of the Code when on the date of the 
original transfer the original transferor was either a Maryland resident or a nonMaryland 
resident and the property has a situs in Maryland); see also IND. CODE ANN. § 6-4.1-11.5-7 
(repealed for decedents dying on or after January 1,2013). According to Professor Hines, the 
CIT does not include transfers currently subject to the federal GST. See James R. Hines, Jr., 
Taxing Inheritances, Taxing Estates, 63 TAX L. REv. 189,202 (2009). Indeed, whether 
Professor Batchelder would keep a GST tax in the CIT is unclear. She states: "To the extent 
that the current tax treatment of ... generation-skipping transfers ... are considered 
desirable or politically necessary, these exemptions could be maintained." Batchelder, supra 
note 7, at 65. However, Professor Batchelder proposes that the CIT have its own type ofGST 
tax with an emphasis on the ultimate beneficiary. See Batchelder, supra note 7, at 66-67 
("Finally, the proposal would tax transfers to grandchildren (and more distant lineal 
descendents) as if the amount inherited had first passed first to their parents (and any 
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transferred within a specified number of years before the decedent's death 
in their inheritance tax base.53 To the extent that an inheritance tax does not 
include all lifetime gifts, however, that inheritance system allows the very 
wealthy to avoid the tax because the wealthiest of individuals can most 
afford to make early-in-life large transfers to their loved ones.54 
Some transfers that are generally not subject to an inheritance tax are 
those inter vivos gifts that include assets over which the donor has retained 
additional skipped generations), and only then to the actual heirs. In practice, this would be 
accomplished by applying an implicit tax to the skipped heir at the top tax rate, unless the 
recipient presented evidence of what the skipped heir would have owed if the funds had 
actually passed to them initially. This treatment should apply regardless of whether the 
transfer is made directly or through a trust."). 
53 Iowa does not have a gift tax, but the state's inheritance tax includes most gifts made 
within 3 years of death. See IOWA CODE § 450.3(2). Likewise, Kentucky's inheritance tax 
includes gifts made within 3 years of a decedent's death unless shown that the decedent did not 
make the gift in contemplation of his or her death. See Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 140.020(2). 
Whether a transfer made more than 3 years prior to the decedent's death was made in 
contemplation of death is a factual question determined by "the proper tribunal." ld.; see also 
Ky. DEP'T OF REVENUE, supra note 14, at 9. Maryland's inheritance tax includes gifts intended 
to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after the decedent's death, gifts in contemplation 
of death, and transfers within 2 years of death even if not in contemplation of death. See MD. 
CODE ANN., TAX-GEN. § 7-201 (d)(1). Nebraska subjects transfers within 3 years of death to 
inheritance taxes when a federal gift tax return must be filed. See NEB. REv. STAT. § 77-2002(2) 
(2013). Pennsylvania's inheritance tax taxes transfers within I year of death as long as that 
transfer in the aggregate exceeds $3,000 in any calendar year. See 72 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 9107(c)(3) (West 2000 & Supp. 2013). When the federal estate and gift tax systems became 
unified under one rate system and credit in 1976 (although the taxes were not unified between 
2002 and 2010), subjecting most transfers made within 3 years of death to federal estate tax 
became unnecessary. See DODGE, GERZOG & CRAWFORD, supra note I, at 33-34 ("The transfer-
in-contemplation-of-death provision has been greatly watered down. What's left of it is located 
in § 2035. The 'testamentary effect' idea has undergone gradual evolution over the years, and 
has been dispersed over Code §§ 2036-2039. Thus, the following nonprobate items attributable 
to inter vivos transfers are currently included in the gross estate: (I) the proceeds of insurance 
on the decedent's life where the insured owned the policy and made a gift of it within three 
years of death (§ 2035(a)); (2) gift tax paid (or owed) on gifts made within three years ofdeath 
(§ 2035(b)); .... "). However, unlike federal law that subjects transfers of certain retained 
powers or interests made within 3 years of death under section 2035(a)(2), New Jersey's 
inheritance tax exempts such transfers from its inheritance tax. See N.J. REv. STAT. § 54:34-1.1 
(2014). Gifts of retained rights or powers made more than 3 years prior to death are deemed not 
made in contemplation of death. See id. 
54 See Margaret Collins, Rich Passing Up $10 Million Opportunity to Gift Tax-Free, 
BLOOMBERG (July 13,2012, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.comlnews/2012-07-13/rich-
passing-up-l O-million-opportunity-to-gift-tax-free.html ("For families with more than $100 
million, deciding to transfer as much as $10 million now may be an easier decision because 
it's a much smaller percentage oftheir net worth .... "). 
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control until his or her death. 55 The federal estate tax ensures that those 
types of lifetime transfers are included in the decedent's taxable estate. 56 If a 
decedent makes a gift but retains either a life interest in that property57 or a 
55 Iowa also includes property either subject to a general power of appointment held by 
the decedent at his or her death, or properly exercised or released within 3 years that, if 
decedent had owned the property outright, would have been includible in his or her estate 
under this section. See IOWA CODE § 450.3(2). The tax treats a transfer creating a general 
power of appointment as a fee property interest transfer and treats other types of powers of 
appointment other than those when the donee makes an election "as the transfer of a life 
estate or term of years in the property subject thereto to the donee of the power and as the 
transfer of the remainder interests to those who would take if the power is not exercised." Id. 
§ 450.3(4). Also, a transfer subject to the decedent's secret request shall be treated as a 
transfer subject to the highest inheritance tax rate. See id. Kentucky's inheritance tax 
provides for the inclusion of gifts when the decedent intends for that gift to take effect at or 
after decedent's death: 
[I]ncluding a transfer under which the transferor has retained for his life 
or any period not ending before his death (a) the possession or enjoyment 
of, or the income from the property; or (b) the actual or contingent power 
to designate the persons who shall possess the property or the income 
therefrom, except in the case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full 
consideration .... 
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 140.020(1). Kentucky's inheritance tax also applies when the settlor 
has a testamentary power to revoke a lifetime gift. See id. In its inheritance tax system, 
Maryland includes gifts in which "the decedent retain[ s] any dominion over the transferred 
property" during his life, including a retained interest, any type of power of revocation, or a 
power of appointment. MD. CODE ANN., TAX-GEN. §§ 7-201(d)(iii)(4), 7-202. 
Pennsylvania's inheritance tax includes gifts in which the decedent retains control over 
assets until death. See 72 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9107(c)(4)-(7). Pennsylvania's inheritance 
tax provisions include parallels to the current estate tax sections 2036(a)(I), 2036(a)(2), 
2037, and 2038, utilizing almost the same language and requirements ofthose federal estate 
tax statutes. See id. In addition, Pennsylvania's inheritance tax includes transfers in which 
the transferee promises either to payor to take care ofthe transferor for the duration of the 
transferor's life as well as section 2038-type transfers in which the power is relinquished 
within I year ofthe transferor's death. See id. Thus, while not subjecting early outright gifts 
to its inheritance tax, Pennsylvania broadly includes the decedent's lifetime gifts in its 
inheritance tax with retained interests or control; by copying the federal estate tax abuse 
prevention statutes, the Pennsylvania inheritance tax uniquely captures more gratuitous 
transfers than most inheritance taxes. See id. 
56 See I.R.C. §§ 2036-2038. Section 2035 includes the date-of-death value of such 
property transfers when the decedent transfers her retained interest or power within 3 years 
of her death. See I.R.C. § 2035. 
57 See I.R.C. § 2036(a)(I). Section 2036 applies to transfers when a decedent retains 
either the income from income producing property or the present enjoyment of nonincome 
producing property for his or her life, for any period not ascertainable without reference to 
his or her death, or for any period that does not end before his or her death. See id. 
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power to control the lifetime possession or enjoyment of that property,58 the 
full date-of-death value of that property will be included in his or her estate 
by means of the estate tax. 59 
Early case law described these types of transfers with lifetime-retained 
control or a lifetime-retained property interest as "will substitutes.'.60 
Congress quickly reacted to three Supreme Court cases61 that allowed 
decedents to avoid estate taxes for gifts of transferred property that the 
decedents had retained a lifetime right to enjoy.62 Congress enacted that 
statute, substantially the same as the current one, to prevent tax avoidance.63 
58 See I.R.C. § 2036(a)(2). Section 2038 applies also to such powers although this 
section's application requires inclusion of only the value ofthe income interest remaining at 
a decedent's death as calculated under the actuarial tables. See I.R.C. § 2038(a)(2). Thus, 
these two sections overlap in some respect. 
59 See I.R.C. § 2036(a). However, when the property itself, and not the income interest, 
is subject to a retained power, only the value of the remainder interest at a decedent's date-
of-death is included in his or her estate. See also I.R.C. § 2038; Treas. Reg. § 20.2038-I(a). 
60 See, e.g., Helvering v. Hallock, 309 u.S. 106, 114 (1940). 
61 See Burnet v. N. Trust Co., 283 U.S. 782 (1931) (per curiam); Morsman v. Burnet, 
283 U.S. 783 (1931) (per curiam); McCormick v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 784 (1931) (per curiam). 
62 See United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 160, 165 (1972) (White, J., dissenting); 
Comm'r v. Estate of Church, 335 U.S. 632, 640 (1949) ("Both houses of Congress 
unanimously passed and the President signed the requested resolution that same day."). 
63 Acting Secretary of the Treasury Ogden Mills stated that without congressional 
action to reverse the three Supreme Court opinions, the resulting loss to the Treasury would 
be "in excess of one-third ofthe revenue derived from the federal estate tax, with anticipated 
refunds of in excess of $25,000,000." Estate of Church, 335 U.S. at 639-40 (citations 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Byrum, 408 U.S. at 159-60 (White, J., 
dissenting). The dialogue between the following Congressmen underscores this intent: 
Mr. HAWLEY. Mr. Speaker and gentlemen, the Supreme Court yesterday 
handed down a decision to the effect that if a person creates a trust of his 
property and provides that, during his lifetime, he shall enjoy the benefits of 
it, and when it is distributed after his death it goes to his heirs-the 
Supreme Court held that it goes to his heirs free of any estate tax. 
Mr. SCHAFER of Wisconsin. This is a bill to tax the rich man. I shall not 
object. 
Mr. SABATH. Reserving the right to object, all the resolution purports to 
do is to place a tax on these trusts that have been in vogue for the last few 
years for the purpose of evading the inheritance tax on the part of some of 
these rich estates? 
Mr. HAWLEY. It provides that hereafter no such method shall be used to 
evade the tax. 
MR. SABATH. That is good legislation. 
74 CONGo REc. 7198 (1931), quoted in Byrum, 408 U.S. at 160 (White, J., dissenting). 
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Congress refused to allow fundamentally testamentary lifetime gifts to 
evade estate tax.64 Ironically, state inheritance taxes were the source of the 
phrase "possession or enjoyment" of property in the federal estate tax 
statute;65 but, with the exception of Pennsylvania, states either have 
eliminated their inheritance tax or have restricted inclusion of lifetime 
transfers to those occurring within a limited time, such as within a year or a 
few years of the decedent's death.66 
Because inter vivos transfers with retained donor control focus on the 
donor-decedent to determine when a gift is complete, the current transfer tax 
system seems to provide a more suitable means to prevent this type of abuse. 
While imperfect,67 the federal transfer taxes are more comprehensive, and 
hence more equitable, than most inheritance tax systems. 
64 See Estate o/Church, 335 U.S. at 646 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) ("Testamentary dispositions of an inter vivos nature cannot escape the force of this 
section by hiding behind legal niceties contained in devices and forms created by 
conveyancers."). 
65 I d. at 637-38 ("The 'possession or enjoyment' provision appearing in § 811(c) seems 
to have originated in a Pennsylvania inheritance tax law in 1826 .... Most ofthe states have 
included the Pennsylvania-originated 'possession or enjoyment' clause in death tax statutes, 
and with what appears to be complete unanimity, they have up to this day ... substantially 
agreed with this 1884 Pennsylvania Supreme Court interpretation."). 
66 See, e.g., supra notes 12, 15,53 and accompanying text. 
67 Section 2036, for example, should be amended to clarify that donor-retained 
corporate fiduciary powers, like donor-retained trustee powers, are subject to the statute. See 
DODGE, GERZOG & CRAWFORD, supra note I, at 393 (citations omitted) ("The majority 
opinion on the § 2036(a)(2) issue was based on the notion that the decedent's power was an 
'administrative power' on account of the fact that it related to trust investments, and then 
stated that administrative powers lay outside of §§ 2036(a)(2) and 2038, relying on a very 
early case (under a different statutory provision) that did not really come to grips with the 
issue, followed by the unsupported (and dubious) claim that estate planners had relied 
continuously on that case. Against the argument that the decedent effectively had retained 
the power to accumulate the trust income, the Court majority said that such power was 
constrained by a general fiduciary duty under corporate law. However, such a duty is as 
general as that which bounds the dispositive discretion of a trustee. The better argument 
would be that the Board of Directors, not the controlling shareholder, has control over 
dividend policy, and the Board would set dividend policy by considering the welfare of the 
corporation rather than according to the beneficial enjoyment of the trust."). 
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B. Rates 
A major tenet central to most inheritance taxes is the relevance of the 
decedent's blood or adopted relation to the beneficiary.68 Many countries 
68 See 2008 JOINT COMMITTEE PRINT, 11 OTH CONGo 7-8,18 (Comm. Print), available at 
https:llwww.jct.gov/publications.htInl?func=fileinfo&id=1318. 
Under the German inheritance tax, for example, the spouse is exempt from 
tax on the first €307,000 ($471,429) received by gift or, subject to certain 
limitations, the first €563,000 ($864,542) received by bequest. Each child 
is exempt from tax on the first€205,000 ($314,798) received by gift. In the 
event of a transfer by bequest, this basic exemption amount is increased by 
an amount up to €52,000 ($79,823) depending on the age of the child. 
Stepchildren, grandchildren, great-grandchildren, and, in the case of a 
bequest, parents and grandparents, are exempt from tax on the first 
€51 ,200 ($78,595) received. Siblings, nieces, nephews, stepparents, sons-
in-law, daughters-in-law, parents-in-law, divorced spouses, and, in the case 
of a gift, parents and grandparents, are exempt from tax on the first 
€1O,300 ($15,811) received. All others are exempt from tax on the first 
€5,200 ($7,982) received. 
Under most existing inheritance tax structures, a larger exemption and 
lower tax rate schedule is assigned to transfers to a surviving spouse, often 
followed by a smaller exemption and higher tax rate schedule for transfers 
to lineal descendents, followed by a yet smaller exemption and higher tax 
rate schedule for transfers to other relatives, followed by an even smaller 
exemption and higher tax rate schedule for other transfers. Consequently, 
in practice, the exemption levels and rate schedules favor retention of 
wealth within the nuclear family as opposed to a broad division of 
transferred wealth. 
Id. Finland has three different rate schedules based on relationships to the transferor in its 
inheritance tax system. See id. at 8. In its gift and inheritance regime, Spain likewise 
distinguishes tax brackets on a relationship basis but also incorporates a tax surcharge that 
varies based on relationship criteria and by the recipients pre-receipt level of wealth. See id. 
at 9; see also IOWA CODE § 450.1 0(1 )-(2) (2014) (lineal tax rate 0%, siblings and son-in-laws 
and daughter-in-laws' inheritance tax rates 5%-10%, and collaterals' tax rates between 10%-
15%); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 140.070(1)-(2) (LexisNexis201O) (lineal tax rate 2%-10% and 
collaterals' tax rate 4%-16%); MD. CODE ANN., TAX-GEN. §§ 7-203(b)(2), 7-204 
(LexisNexis 2010) (lineal tax rate 0%, sibling tax rate 0%, and collaterals' tax rate 10%); 
NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 77-2004, to -2006 (2013) (lineal and sibling tax rate 1 % over $40,000 
exemption, remote relatives' rate 13% over $15,000 exemption, and collaterals' tax rate 18% 
over $10,000 exemption); N.J. REv. STAT. § 54:34-2 (2014) (sibling tax rate 11%-16% 
depending upon amount of transfer, collateral tax rate 15% for amounts up to $700,000 and 
16% on amounts in excess of 700,000); 72 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9116 (West 2000 & 
Supp. 2013) (lineal tax rate 4.5%, sibling tax rate 12%, and collaterals' tax rate 15%). 
Historically, the federal inheritance tax that existed at the tum of the nineteenth century 
imposed different rates depending on the familial relationship between the decedent and the 
beneficiary. See SURREY, McDANIEL & GUTMAN, supra note 2, at 3. 
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and individual states allow preferred rates,69 or zero rates/o for lineal 
descendents of the decedent. In those instances, the tax generates much less 
revenue because most decedents pass property to their children and 
grandchildren.71 Thus, more distant blood or adopted relatives are subjectto 
higher rates, and nonrelative beneficiaries are generally accorded the very 
highest rates.72 A few systems include step-relatives somewhere in a 
preferred rate structure. 73 
Different rates based on relationships, however, make less sense than 
imposing different progressive rates based on the varying total amounts of 
property passing either from the decedent or to the beneficiaries.74 While. 
some states have progressive rates, those rates are usually applied after an 
exemption based on the familial relationship between the decedent and the 
beneficiary; other states have separate progressive rate structures depending 
69 See 2008 JOINT COMMITTEE PRINT, I 10TH CONGo at 18. 
70 See, e. g., IOWA CODE § 450.9 ("In computing the tax on the net estate, the entire 
amount of property, interest in property, and income passing to the surviving spouse, and 
parents, grandparents, great-grandparents, and other lineal ascendants, children including 
legally adopted children and biological children entitled to inherit under the laws of this state, 
stepchildren, and grandchildren, great-grandchildren, and other lineal descendants are exempt 
from tax."); see also Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 140.080(1)(c); MD. CODE ANN., TAX-GEN. § 7-
203(b)(2); N.J. REv. STAT. § 54:34-2(a)(2). 
71 
See Kaplow, supra note 9, at 175. 
72 See supra note 68 and accompanying text 
73 
See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 450.9; Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 140.070(1); see also N.J. REv. 
STAT. § 54:34-2.1. New Jersey also treats as a decedent-child relationship those mutually 
acknowledged relationships of at least 10 years duration, beginning at or prior to the child's 
fifteenth birthday. Although Indiana recently passed legislation to eliminate its inheritance 
tax, beginning January I, 2013 retroactively, the Indiana provision had provided for 
stepchildren in its classification system. See IND. CODE ANN. § 6-4.1-1-3(a)(3) (LexisNexis 
2007 & Supp. 2011). For decedents dying after June 30, 2004 and before January 1,2013, 
Indiana defined a Class A transferee as a "[s]tepchild of the transferor, whether or not the 
stepchild is adopted by the transferor." Id. 
74 Wealth distribution is logically affected py one's personal situation. Thus, telling a 
decedent without children that he would lose a tax benefit if he were to pass his or her 
property to a collateral relative or unrelated friend is both unreasonable and unkind; likewise, 
telling a decedent with a child that he or she would lose a tax benefit by passing his or her 
property to that child is unreasonable and unkind. Taxing a wealthy decedent on property 
passing at death at either progressive or high rates depending upon the size of his or her 
estate, regardless of his or her beneficiaries, is a much more reasonable, compassionate, and 
equitable way to raise revenue and to support public programs. 
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on that relationship.75 Because decedents leave property to their loved ones, 
usually only fortuitous circumstances dictate whether those individuals are 
lineal descendents, more distant relatives, or nonre1ations.76 
C. Exemptions for Specific Types of Property 
Some inheritance taxes exempt certain types of property, such as life 
insurance proceeds, from taxation.77 However, omitting a class of bequests 
75 See, e.g., IND. CODE Ann. § 6-4.1-3-IO(b )(repealed 2013), available at www.in.gov/ 
legislativelic/code/title6/ar4.lIch3.htrnl. Indiana's fonner law illustrates the complexity of 
such an elaborate structure: 
With respect to a taxable transfer or transfers resulting from the death of a 
decedent who dies after December 31, 2011, the first two hundred fifty 
thousand dollars ($250,000) of property interests transferred to a Class A 
transferee under the taxable transfer or transfers is exempt from the 
inheritance tax. 
Id. However, a class B or class C beneficiary may exempt very little from the value decedent 
transferred to her: "The first five hundred dollars ($500) of property interests transferred to a 
Class B transferee under a taxable transfer or transfers is exempt from the inheritance tax."; and 
"[ t ]he first one hundred dollars ($100) of property interests transferred to a Class C transferee 
under a taxable transfer or transfers is exempt from the inheritance tax." IND. CODE ANN. 
§ 6-4.1-3-11, -3-12. Applying the appropriate exemption amount in Indiana, evidences a 
progressive rate structure; however, those rates are also dependent on the decedent's 
relationship with the beneficiary. See id. § 6-4. 1-5-1 (b)-(c). Class A beneficiaries are taxed 
from 1 %-10% marginal tax rates with the 10% bracket rate applying to net transfers over 
$1,500,000 (that is, $92,250, plus 10% of net taxable value over $1 ,500,000). See id. § 6-4.1-5-
1 (b). Class B beneficiaries are taxed from 7%-15% marginal tax rates with the 15% rate 
applying to transfers over $1,000,000 ($107,000, plus 15% of net taxable value over 
$1,000,000). See id. § 6-4.1-5-1 ( c). Class C beneficiaries are taxed from 10%-20% marginal tax 
rates with the 20% rate applying to transfers over $1,000,000 ($145,000, plus 20% of net 
taxable value over $1,000,000). See id. § 6-4.1-5-1(d). 
76 See Estate of Odie v. Ind. Dep't of State Revenue, 991 N.E.2d 631 (Ind. T.C. 2013). 
Although the estate lost this case because its claim "was not adequately developed," the 
estate wanted the court to treat the beneficiaries as Class A rather than Class B or C 
beneficiaries (which they literally were under the state's inheritance statute) because 
Indiana's state constitution prohibited the legislature to "grant any title of nobility, nor confer 
hereditary distinctions." !d. at 633, n.l, quoting IND. CONST. art. 1, § 35. That is, the estate 
claimed a constitutional violation of Article 1 and Section 35 of Indiana's Constitution 
because the inheritance tax granted benefits to individuals based solely on birth distinctions. 
See id. at 632-33. In OdIe, the decedent was a widower; he and his wife had no children. See 
id. at 633. The facts stated that this circumstance was the reason that he left his property "to 
several collateral relatives, including nephews, great nieces, and great nephews." Id. This 
common reason for not passing property to one's descendents inequitably, unreasonably, and 
unkindly, resulted in a heavier tax burden. See id. 
77 See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 140.030(2) ("The proceeds of an insurance policy 
payable to a designated beneficiary, including a testamentary or inter vivos trustee, other 
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without an exceptional rationale is inefficient and inequitable. As such, 
exemptions should be granted sparingly and only when necessary to pursue 
another important policy goal. Yet, some inheritance taxes exempt various 
types of property without a sufficient rationale.78 Internationally, for 
example, while the exemption for household goods may make sense on 
simplicity grounds (especially if the total value is fairly insignificant), 
Germany's additional exemption for artwork, which is fairly complex and 
much more revenue-costly, may be more problematic. Moreover, exempting 
certain types of property from the tax may encourage tax avoidance. It 
allows the taxpayer to plan around such favoritism, which in turn may 
undermine other goals of the tax.79 
Life insurance on the decedent's life is inherently testamentary, but 
some states like Maryland do not subject the proceeds to an inheritance tax, 
which in turn erodes the tax base and exaggerates inequalities.80 By 
contrast, two Code sections require the proceeds of life insurance on the 
than the assured or his estate, shall be tax-free."); MD. CODE ANN., TAX-GEN. § 7-203(d) 
(LexisNexis 2010) ("The inheritance tax does not apply to the receipt of the proceeds ofa 
life insurance policy payable to any beneficiary other than the estate of the insured."); N.J. 
REv. STAT. § 54:34-4( c), -4(f), -4(g). Ireland also exempts some life insurance proceeds from 
its gift and inheritance taxes. See 2008 JOINT COMMITTEE PRINT, I 10TH CONGo 8 (Comm. 
Print), available at https:llwww.jct.gov/publications.html?func=fileinfo&id=13l8. 
78 See, e.g., id. ("The German inheritance tax, for example, provides an exemption for 
household goods, works of art, and certain other property. "). Germany, which partially (60% 
or 85%) or fully exempts artworks from its inheritance tax base, allows the heir to remain the 
owner. See STEPHAN SCHERER, THE HANDLING OF WORKS OF ART IN GERMAN INHERITANCE 
TAX LAW 1-2 (2011), available at http://www.sza.de/fileadminlfm-damlMandanteninfor 
mationenl20 11_ Oct_N _ Client_Information _German_Inheritance_Tax _Law. pdf. The sliding 
scale seems to depend on whether the artwork has significance, whether it remains in 
Germany or the European Union, whether the artwork is made available to the public to 
some extent, and whether the associated maintenance and preservation costs exceed any 
revenue produced. See id. The 100% exemption also requires that the owner own the piece or 
collection for at least 20 years. See id. Although art may be difficult to value, omitting those 
assets provides a large loophole in any tax system. 
79 For example, if life insurance proceeds are exempt in an inheritance tax system 
favoring lineal descendents, an estate planner might well suggest that a client with a 
collateral beneficiary name that collateral as an insurance beneficiary and pass nonexempt 
property to tax-favored relationship beneficiaries. 
80 Originally, life insurance proceeds were not included in a decedent's estate. 
Motivated by insurance companies advocating additional purchases oflife insurance to evade 
the new estate tax, Congress specifically added insurance as subject to the tax in 1918. See 
SURREY, McDANIEL & GUTMAN, supra note 2, at 524-25; see also DODGE, GERZOG & 
CRAWFORD, supra note 1, at 240. 
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decedent's life to be included in his or her estate for estate tax purposes.81 
The first provision requires the inclusion of insurance proceeds on the 
decedent's life either when the proceeds pass to the estate or when the 
decedent owned any of the incidents of ownership (that is, the economic 
benefits)82 of the policy at death.83 The second provision requires inclusion 
if the decedent transferred the insurance or relinquished an incident of 
ownership within 3 years of death.84 Since 1981, however, insurance 
proceeds in an irrevocable life insurance trust (ILlT), which holds all of the 
ownership incidents, are exempt from estate tax under the plain language of 
the statutes.85 Thus, the current estate tax provisions should be amended to 
reverse that result as well. 
81 See LR.C. §§ 2042, 2035(a). Section 2042 replaced section 811(g) of the 1939 Code. 
In addition, section 2033 includes insurance owned by the decedent on another's life in the 
estate at its fair market value at decedent's date-of-death (generally at the interpolated 
terminal reserve value). See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-8. 
82 See Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1 (c )(2). Incidents of ownership are defined broadly in the 
regulations to include the economic benefits of the policy and powers such as the ability to 
change the policy's beneficiary or to obtain a loan against its cash-surrender value. Incidents 
of ownership also include a more than de minimis interest. See LR.C. § 2042(2) (exceeding 
"five percent ofthe value ofthe policy immediately before the death ofthe decedent"). The 
value of a reversionary interest is determined by utilizing the traditional methods of 
valuation like the actuarial tables. See id. When the decedent holds any of the incidents of 
ownership on insurance on his or her own life, the entire proceeds are includible in his or her 
gross estate. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-I(a)(3). 
83 See I.R.C. § 2042(1 )-(2). 
84 
See LR.C. § 2035(a). 
85 Between 1942 and 1954, section 2042 required estate tax inclusion oflife insurance 
on a decedent's life either because the decedent had owned the incidents of ownership in the 
policy or the decedent had paid the insurance premiums. However, in 1954, the premium 
payment test was abandoned to allow the decedent to avoid estate tax inclusion if the 
decedent had transferred all incidents of ownership more than 3 years before his or her death. 
See DODGE, GERZOG & CRAWFORD, supra note 1, at 240-41. Moreover, the payment of 
premiums within 3 years of death no longer affects inclusion of the proceeds under section 
2035(a) because the "beamed transfer" of premium payments is no longer a basis for 
inclusion under that section as of 1981. See Estate of Headrick v. Cornm'r, 93 T.C. 171 
(1989), aff'd, 918 F.2d 1263 (6th Cir.l990), action on dec., 1991-012 (July 3,1991); Estate 
ofLederv. Cornm'r, 89 T.C. 235 (1987), aff'd, 893 F.2d 237 (10th Cir.1989). Thus, the sole 
incidents of ownership test paved the way for the viability of JL TTS-that is, the current 
literal language of section 2042 provides a loophole for the decedent's paid life insurance on 
his or her own life to escape estate taxation. See Headrick, 918 F.2d at 263. ILlTs do not 
receive much criticism; that may be not only because of the strong insurance lobby but also 
because ILlTs provide liquidity for an estate, which in tum means a quick source of funds for 
estate tax payments, pleasing all parties including the government. 
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D. Transfers to Charity 
In probably all tax systems, gifts to charities are fully or partially 
exempt from taxation.86 The benefits of the current transfer tax system 
include encouraging charitable gifts, both directly and indirectly.87 Some 
have pointed to the effect of charitable donations on the redistributive goal 
of the current transfer taxes.88 However, split-interest gifts that provide 
benefits for both charitable and noncharitable beneficiaries have been,89 and 
continue to be,90 the source of abuse in the estate tax area. A major strength 
of an inheritance tax is that, with a split-interest trust the noncharitable 
beneficiaries are taxed when their interests become possessory. This 
preferable tax treatment contrasts with the current transfer tax treatment of 
split-interest trusts that requires the use of the actuarial tables to value both 
the amounts of the charitable deduction and the non charitable beneficiaries' 
interest at the time the property is transferred to the statutorily-defined split-
interest trust. Allowing actuarial value estimates to trump actual values 
received is a major flaw in the current transfer tax system.91 
86 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 170,2522,2055 (income tax, gift tax, and estate tax); Batchelder, 
supra note 7, at 81-82. Because charities are tax exempt under the income tax system when a 
donor or a decedent transfers property to a charity, the recipient will have no taxable income. 
See Batchelder, supra note 7, at 81-82. 
87 See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 9, at 185 ("Suffice it to say for present purposes that 
charitable giving is significant and may be greatly influenced by transfer taxation. Effects 
can also arise indirectly. For example, some oppose repeal or significant reduction of transfer 
taxation because the subsidy for charitable giving via exemption would thereby be 
eliminated. "). 
88 See Aron-Dine, supra note 6, at 269 ("[T]here is evidence that the impact on 
charitable giving may be large. This is another issue worth bearing in mind in thinking about 
how wealth transfer taxes affect the distribution of resources in our society."). 
89 Prior to the 1969 legislation, requiring certain strict forms for split-interest gifts to 
charity, taxpayers routinely inflated their charitable deduction by overvaluing the interest 
purportedly passing to a charity and undervaluing the interest passing to the noncharitable 
beneficiary. See COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, H.R. REp. No. 91-
413, pt. I, at 38-39 (1969); S. REp. No. 91-522, at 86-88 (1969). 
90 
See generally Wendy C. Gerzog, From the Greedy to the Needy, 87 OR. L. REv. 1133 
(2008); Wendy C. Gerzog, The Times They Are Not A-Changin '; Reforming the Charitable 
Split-Interest Rules (Again), 85 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 849 (2010) [hereinafter Reforming 
Charitable Split-Interest Rules]. 
91 See generally Gerzog, From the Greedy to the Needy, supra note 90; Reforming 
Charitable Split-Interest Rules, supra note 90. See also infra Part IV. 
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E. Transfers to Spouse 
Most inheritance tax systems allow unlimited transfers between 
spouses;92 some countries that do not recognize same-sex marriages also 
include transfers between domestic partners.93 Though not necessarily 
supported by the couple as "one person" theor/4 because couples differ in 
their property sharing arrangements, other reasons exist for allowing this 
exemption.95 Some relationships (especially those in a community property 
model) embrace the partnership theory of ownership for married couples,96 
92 In 1981, Congress selected the marital unit as the unit of taxation for estate and gift 
taxes. See Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA) of1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 403(d)(1), 95 
Stat. 172, 302-03 (codified as amended at l.R.C. 2056). The exemption is a deferral 
provision, requiring inclusion in the surviving spouse's estate. See, e.g., 72 P A. CONS. STAT. 
ANN. § 9107(d) (West 2000 & Supp. 2013) ("All succeeding interests which follow the 
interest of a surviving spouse in a trust or similar arrangement, to the extent specified in 
section 2113, are transfers subject to tax as if the surviving spouse were the transferor."). 
93 See 2008 JOINT COMMITTEE PRINT, 110TH CONGo 8 (Comm. Print), available at 
https:llwww.jct.gov/publications.html?func=fileinfo&id=1318 ("In France, beginning August 
22, 2007, inheritances between spouses and between unmarried individuals who live together 
and have entered into a partner contract are exempt from inheritance tax."). 
94 See, e.g., Estate and Gift Taxes: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 
94th Congo 1187 (1976) [hereinafter Statement of Charles M. Walker] (statement of Charles 
M. Walker, Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, Dep't of Treasury); U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, 
GENERAL AND TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF H.R. 3849, 97TH CONG., 1 ST SESS., reprinted in 8 
TAX MANAGEMENT: PRIMARY SOURCES, SERIES IV 39 (Tax Mgmt. Inc. ed., 1982); U.S. 
TREAS. DEP'T, 91st Cong., TAX REFORM STUDIES AND PROPOSALS (Comm. Print 1969), 
reprinted in RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE AT 
WASHINGTON, D.C. MAY 23-24, 1968 AND REpORTERS' STUDIES (1969) [hereinafter A.L.I. 
RECOMMENDATIONS]; AM. LAW INST., FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION: A.L.I. 
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra, at 258. 
95 Other justifications for the change to an unlimited marital deduction include removing 
problems involved in tracing interspousal transfers, aiding married couples with more modest 
estates, and simplifying the administration of the provision. See Statement of Charles M. 
Walker, supra note 94, at 1187-88; COMM. ON FINANCE ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 
1981,S. REp. No. 97-144, at 127 (1981); COMM.ONWAYSANDMEANS, TAX iNcENTIVE ACT OF 
1981, H.R. REp. No. 97-201, at 159 (1981); COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, ESTATE AND GIFT 
TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976, H.R. REp. No. 94-1380, at 17 (1976); STAFF OF J. COMM. ON 
TAXATION, 97TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 
1981, 233 (Comm. Print) ("Under prior law, it was often extremely difficult to determine the 
ownership of property held within the marital unit and to determine whose funds were used to 
acquire that property."); A.L.I. RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 94, at 354. 
96 The partnership theory of marriage is the basis for community property statutes. See 
Bea Ann Smith, The Partnership Theory of Marriage: A Borrowed Solution Fails, 68 TEx. 
L. REv. 689, 697 (1990) ("Recognizing the economic risk that divorce poses to women and 
to mothers, states adopted the partnership concept specifically to increase the distribution of 
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but the better explanation for most exemptions for spousal transfers is the 
practical difficulties in tracing a couple's property as the property is often 
intermingled or continually exchanged.97 One commentator has suggested, 
however, that the marital deduction may be unnecessary with an income-
inclusion or CIT approach because of the income tax date-of-death benefit of 
a potential basis step_up98 accorded to property received from a decedent,99 
III. THE COMPREHENSIVE INHERITANCE TAX (CIT) PROPOSAL 
In the CIT Proposal, Professor Batchelder suggests merging transfer 
taxes into the income tax system when gifts or bequests received by an 
individual aggregate to more than $1.9 million.100 After that threshold, the 
donee's excess would be subject to income tax inclusion at a 15% surtax 
above the donee's income tax rate. 101 Because each recipient has different 
economic means, Professor Batchelder concludes that taxing the donee 
more accurately reflects that person's ability to pay; likewise, she argues 
that the goal of imposing a 15% surtax on the highest income tax rate is to 
match the earned income rate, which requires including an additional tax to 
replicate the effect ofthe payroll tax. 102 However, with respect to the estate 
tax, she contends that assessing the incidence of tax is difficult,103 
Professor Batchelder criticizes the present transfer tax system as taxing 
inherited wealth less than earned income. She states that "[i]nherited wealth 
is currently taxed at one-fourth the rate of earned income due to high estate 
property to women upon divorce and thus to offset the economic losses caused by divorce.") 
(citation omitted). 
97 See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
98 See I.R.C. § 1014. Note, however, that the statute defines basis as the fair market value 
at a decedent's date-of-death or, if elected, the alternate valuation date. See id. Although most 
property appreciates and thus incurs a step-up in basis, when property loses value section 1014 
requires a step-down in basis, which is disadvantageous to the recipient of the property. 
99 See David Joulfaian, Commentary, Replacing the Estate Tax with an Inheritance 
Tax: A Re-Examination, 63 TAX L. REv. 209, 210 (2009). 
100 
See Batchelder, supra note 7, at 62. 
101 See id. 
102 See id. at 2; see also 2008 Hearings on Alternatives, supra note 1, at 3 (statement of 
Professor Lily Batchelder) ("So in effect, extraordinary inheritances would then be taxed at 
the same rate that earned income is now taxed under the income and payroll tax."). 
103 See Batchelder, supra note 7, at 6; see also 2008 Hearings on Alternatives, supra 
note 1, at 3 (statement of Professor Lily Batchelder) ("In my view, its biggest weakness is 
that this relationship between, on one hand, the heir's financial circumstances, and on the 
other hand, the estate tax burden, is relatively imprecise."). 
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tax exemptions and the exclusion of inheritances from the income and 
payroll tax bases.,,104 Although the current transfer tax may well under-tax 
wealth, any inheritance tax advocating a high exemption level per recipient 
is open to that same criticism. 105 While the surtax results in a higher burden 
for those receipts above Professor Batchelder's exemption amount,106 
Congress more easily could accomplish the same result by raising estate and 
gift tax rates or by lowering the exemption level. Also, the conversation 
cannot realistically be about wealth redistribution because only 22% of the 
recipients are not in the highest income tax bracket. For the majority of 
recipients, the CIT has no significant policy objective and may well 
decrease the taxation of wealth.107 Moreover, under the CIT, which 
advocates a $1.9 million per donee exemption, I 08 family wealth 
concentration would persist. 109 
Some concerns about an inheritance tax with large exemptions, such as 
the CIT, are horizontal inequities 110 -particularly when identical businesses 
pass to different sized families. I II Related to that issue is whether the estate 
104 
Batchelder, supra note 7, at 2. 
105 See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text. 
106 Professor Batchelder's surtax affects only those gifts and bequests that in the 
aggregate exceed her exemption amount. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
107 See infra notes 118-119 and accompanying text. 
108 
See Batchelder, supra note 7, at 62--67. 
109 
See Kopczuk, supra note 43, at 139 ("[T]here are stronger arguments for estate 
taxation to be made based on externalities from wealth concentration."). In her indictment of 
the tax burden unfairly taxing heirs, Professor Batchelder does not view family wealth as a 
concentrated unit. Indeed, her proposal is intended to "allocate burdens much more fairly at 
an individual level. " Batchelder, supra note 7, at 69. Because her paradigm emphasizes the 
inequitable tax burden of heirs and does not consider the unique relationship generally 
characteristic of closely related beneficiaries, Professor Batchelder does not attach value to 
family wealth remaining in the family. Nevertheless, it helps to know, after the decedent dies 
and passes wealth to his or her children, whether those children at some later time make gifts 
to each other when a sibling or other close relative is in need. Likewise, it helps to know 
whether and to what extent the decedent passes disproportionate bequests either to aid a less 
wealthy sibling or to pass more wealth to a more sensible sibling so that, either formally 
(through a legal instrument) or informally (by precatory request or moral implication), that 
sibling can assist another sibling who cannot handle a large amount of money. 
110 See, e.g., Hines, supra note 52, at 191. 
III See Udell, supra note 7, at 217 ("An inheritance tax, with a generous individual 
exemption can create significant horizontal equity distortions under these provisions for 
equal size businesses inherited by families of different sizes."). 
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tax provisions beneficial to family fanns and small businesses can and 
would be incorporated into an inheritance tax. I 12 
Additionally, inserting an inheritance tax into an income tax system (the 
payment vehicle for the CIT) may be less a solution for issues related to a 
recipient's ability to pay than a full-income inclusion approach with or 
without an additional independent transfer tax system. Allowing a large 
exemption for gifts and bequests makes an inheritance tax regime like the 
CIT proposal look more like the current estate and gift tax regime and less 
like the income tax system that is based on goals of fairness and ability to 
pay. Special exclusions and large exemptions make sense in a wealth 
transfer tax system, particularly for purchasing consumption items and 
exempting all but the wealthy from the tax. Contrary to ensuring the goal of 
horizontal equity in the income tax system, those large exemptions are 
unique and offensive to the treatment of other types of income. In an 
income tax system with the CIT, the CIT appears incongruent with much of 
the income tax provisions that are geared to ability-to-pay concepts. I 13 No 
other income tax provision ignores a windfall of$I.9 million of income. 114 
112 See id. 
113 Professor Batchelder justifies the CIT exemption on two grounds: 
On the one hand, its exemption protects a basic level of familial 
economic support that one hopes all parents will provide so that each 
child has a reasonable opportunity to grow and flourish. On the other 
hand, by gradually taxing inherited wealth in excess of this amount, a 
comprehensive inheritance tax encourages extraordinarily wealthy donors 
to share further wealth transfers with individuals who have fewer 
opportunities than their children. 
Batchelder, supra note 7, at 3. First, while a large exemption is sensible in a transfer tax system, 
the income tax system currently provides for personal exemptions and the standard deduction in 
much more modest amounts that represent "a basic level offamilial economic support." Jd. 
Admittedly, those deductions pale in comparison to the $1.9 million per-person lifetime 
exemption. Secondly, as already theorized, people will continue to leave their property to those 
relatively few people they love, and wealthy people generally name their wealthy family 
members and friends as their beneficiaries. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text This 
pattern of giving would unlikely change. Those who want tax advantages already have the 
option of making charitable contributions to aid the poor; yet, most wealthy people contribute 
to their own charitable foundations, favorite museum, or alma maters. See Ken Stem, Why the 
Rich Don 'f Give To Charity, ATLANTIC (Mar. 20, 2013, 9:50PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/ 
magazine/archive/20 l3/04/why-the-rich-dont -give/309254/. 
114 The income tax exclusion sections do not aggregate to exceedingly large amounts of 
untaxed dollars. The de minimis fringe benefit, for example, underlines the income tax 
rejection of ignoring so large a benefit. See I.R.C. § 132(e); Treas. Reg. § 1.132-6(d)(l), 
-6(d)(4), -6(e)(J). The only exception is, of course, the current exemption for gifts and 
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Professor Batchelder's criticism about the under-taxation of inherited 
wealth supports a full income-inclusion approach for gifts and inherited 
wealth. In contrast to the CIT, a full-income inclusion system would be 
much simpler and more equitable. I 15 
In 2009, under the then-current estate and gift tax system in effect when 
Professor Batchelder proposed the CIT, each donor could exempt a total of 
$1 million in aggregate gifts and a total of $3.5 million in total gifts and 
bequests. I 16 Also, generally wealth transfers are from parents to children. I 17 
Thus, in 2009, the CIT would have produced additional revenue when a 
parent had one wealthy child, but a parent with two rich children would 
have received a total of$3.8 million, rather than $3.5 million, tax-free. A 
family with four children would have received $7.6 million tax-free. I 18 If, as 
previously suggested, wealth redistribution means greater tax revenue that 
can be applied either to more spending or lower tax burdens for the less 
wealthy, the CIT is likely to result in less wealth redistribution than the 
current transfer tax system. I 19 
The CIT also imposes complexity with its disparate and somewhat 
unusual 15% rate surcharge. 120 Such additional taxes in the income tax 
bequests under section 102; however, that section is rationalized at least in part because we 
have a transfer tax system. 
115 While more equitable, inclusion of gifts or bequests by focusing on the donees 
rather than the donor multiplies the practical difficulties of compliance. See supra note 46 
and accompanying text; see also infra notes 126-129 and accompanying text. In 1894, the 
income tax statute taxed recipients on their gifts and inheritances; however, that treatment 
lasted only I year when the Supreme Court in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 
U.S. 429, vacated on reargument, 158 U.S. 601 (1895), held that tax unconstitutional as a 
"direct tax." See SURREY, McDANIEL & GUTMAN, supra note 2. 
116 See I.R.C. §§ 2010, 2505; INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, Estate Tax, available at 
www.irs.govlBusinesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-EmployedlEstate-Tax. 
117 See Kaplow, supra note 9, at 175 ("[M]ost gifts are to relatives, the largest being 
from parents to children."). 
118 Assuming Congress in 2014-2015 is willing to increase exemption levels, aggregate 
family wealth would likely also increase under the CIT proposal as history has proved. 
119 Likewise, as Professor Hines emphasizes, the CIT may lack a GST tax, which in turn 
would result in more wealth concentration and lower tax revenue than the current transfer tax 
system. See Hines, supra note 52, at 203-04 ("The logic of inheritance taxation suggests 
removing the tax on generation-skipping transfers as part of a broader package of transfer tax 
reforms, but such a reform might have the paradoxical effect of promoting greater wealth 
concentration than that which would materialize in the absence of any wealth transfer taxes. "). 
120 The unpopUlar bubble, subjecting estates between $10 million and $17.184 million 
to a federal surtax starting at 5% to the top rate of55%, effectively eliminated the benefits of 
the lower marginal rates applicable to the first $3 million of property in an estate and the $1 
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context are generally the result of penalties; the CIT surcharge adds 
complexity and does not fit well conceptually into that framework. 121 In 
2009, the income tax maximum bracket was 35% while the maximum 
transfer tax rate was 45%.122 Attaching a 15% surcharge to the 35% income 
tax rate would have subjected the excess to an additional 5% tax or to an 
income tax maximum rate of 50%. That additional 5% rate, however, might 
well recoup some of the shortfall that the decedent would cause by leaving 
his wealth to more than one beneficiary. 
As noted by other commentators,123 the CIT, like many state inheritance 
taxes, is dependent upon many of the current transfer tax concepts and 
terminology. 124 By merging the transfer tax language into the income tax 
system and by focusing on the transferee rather than on the transferor, the 
CIT increases complexity for a greater number of taxpayers. To the extent 
that the effect falls on lower income taxpayers, whom Professor Batchelder 
aims to assist, the CIT would increase those taxpayers' tax return 
preparation costs. Similarly, the CIT would increase the burdensome 
million exemption, until it was eliminated in the 2001 Act. See 2001 ACT EXPLANATION, 
11 OTH CONG., 57,63-64 (Comm. Print 2003). The surtax intended to create an overall 55% 
rate for those estates by imposing the surtax and taxing those amounts at 60%. See id.; see 
also AUCUTT, supra note 39, at 6. 
121 See 2008 Hearings on Alternatives, supra note I, at 77 (statement of Professor 
Joseph M. Dodge) ("An inheritance tax is basically like an estate and gift tax, but with a 
more complicated rate and exemption structure. "). Professor Udell is cautious about the lack 
of a clear basis for integrating income and transfer taxes into a two-tier rate system: 
The notion that the eventual wealth transfer tax rate should depend upon 
the particular income tax rate of the heir in the year that she receives an 
inheritance does not appear to be grounded in an argument that ties the 
two bases together. For example, it does not relate the wealth tax base to 
the income tax as, perhaps, a correction for income that is not measured 
well in the income tax. 
Udell, supra note 7, at 216. Udell envisions that through prearranging one's transaction, 
many estates would begin with a 0% rate before an inheritance tax rate is 
applied. Because it is not impossible to plan into losses that flow through 
a schedule E onto the form 1040 to achieve this result, the relationship 
between the estate and income tax bases will become important with a 
comprehensive inheritance tax. 
ld. at 217. 
122 See Rev. Proc. 2008-66, 2008-45 LR.B. llO7, lllO tb1.3 (2008). 
123 See Joulfaian, supra note 99, at 212 ("More importantly, the proposed inheritance 
tax would not replace the estate tax. Its starting point is the division of bequests reported on 
the estate tax return. "); supra note 17, and accompanying text. 
124 See supra notes 1 7-19. 
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administrative duties and costs of executors. By contrast, very wealthy 
individuals deal with complex financial issues routinely. Although some 
wealthy taxpayers may urge the need for simplicity, they generally seek 
simplicity only when it results in their paying lower taxes. While, for 
example, taxing wealth without any valuation discounting is simpler, many 
wealthy taxpayers are fine creating complex transactions as long as the 
bottom line leaves them richer.125 
Moreover, compliance issues riddle the CIT proposal. 126 Accounting for 
gifts in an income tax system would be much more difficult than with the 
current estate and gift tax system in which virtually all of the applicable 
decedents' estate tax returns (currently less than 1 % of all estates) are 
examined127 and delinquent gift tax returns are often filed at the decedent's 
death. In 2012, the number of individual income tax returns filed was 
182,332,000; in that same year, 27,000 estate tax returns were filed-a ratio 
125 
See, e.g., Estate of Walton v. Comm'r, 115 T.C. 589 (2000), acq., 2003-72, 2003-2 
C.B. 964. The court invalidated then-Example 5 Of Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-3(e), but also 
implicitly validated the taxpayer's use of short-term two-year zeroed-out grantor retained 
annuity trusts (GRATs), allowing the taxpayer to avoid the gift tax and to transfer additional 
value to family members transfer tax-free. See id. Family LLC's and FLPs, are also popular 
means by which the taxpayer reduces the value ofliquid assets, typically from 30% to 70% 
by transferring those assets to family entities and then by transferring supposedly devalued 
entity interests to the younger members of the family. See DODGE, GERZOG & CRAWFORD, 
supra note I, at 452. Taxpayers also use charitable lead annuity trusts (CLATs), by properly 
employing the actuarial tables to zero-out noncharitable family gifts. See id at 460-61. 
126 See Kaplow, supra note 9, at 159, n.l (citations omitted) ("Also, no attention is given 
to administrative concerns, especially pertaining to avoidance as well as the possibility that a 
transfer tax may in certain respects serve to backstop an income tax (although it can also reduce 
income tax receipts by heightening the benefits of schemes that reduce both taxes)."); see also 
Louis Kaplow, A Framework/or Assessing Estate and Gift Taxation, in RETIllNKING ESTATE 
AND GIFT TAXATION 164, 181, 186-90 (William G. Gale et aI., eds., 2001). 
127 Because of personal liability risks, most executors of decedents' estates filing estate 
tax returns ask for and receive a closing letter from the Service before distributing the 
decedent's assets. See 31 U.S.C. § 3713 (2006). The 2012 rates of return examination for 
returns filed in 2011 were only 1.03% for individual income tax returns. See INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERVICE DATA BOOK, 2012, DEP'TOF TREASURY 26 tbI.9b (2013) [hereinafter IRS 
2012 DATA BOOK] (applying data from October 1,2011 to September 30,2012); FrankByrt, 
IRS 2011 Audit Rates Show Estate Tax Returns Under the Microscope, ACCOUNTINGWEB 
(Mar. 27, 2013), http://www.accountingweb.comlarticle/irs-2011-audit-rates-show-estate-
tax-returns-under-microscope/221442 ("Those estate returns with assets of$IO million or 
more had an effective 116 percent rate of audit, as the IRS also examined returns in that 
category filed in prior tax years, in addition [to] those filed in 2011, and included them in the 
total fiscal year 2012 activity.") (applying the data from the IRS 2012 DATA BOOK). 
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of approximately 6753 to 1.128 Reviewing all income tax returns to discover 
non-compliance with gifts would be a mammoth, and probably impossible, 
task 129 
Finally, any inheritance tax is dependent upon gathering information 
about the decedent's transfers. As stated by Joulfaian about the CIT, "It 
merely shifts the statutory incidence of the tax to the heirs while leaving in 
place all the existing complexities of deriving the size of the estate to be 
divided among the heirs.,,!3O 
A simpler solution to deal with the inequities that the CIT intends to 
cure is to reinstitute a more progressive rate system into the current transfer 
tax system. Because of the large exemption and because the rate tables have 
remained the same, transfer tax rates have been a flat rate of 45% between 
2007 and 2009, of35% between 2010 and 2012, and, of40% in 2013 and 
2014. 131 If the rates were changed to include multiple brackets so that those 
estates nearest to the exemption amount were, for example, taxed at a 35% 
rate, and rates were to progress to a top rate of 50%, the impact on less rich 
128 
See IRS 2012 DATA BOOK, supra note 127, at 4 tbl. 2. 
129 Recall the checkered history and continual compliance issues of taxing waiters' tip 
income in the restaurant industry, in which third parties and business records are common 
characteristics (unlike with family gratuitous transfers). See Food Industry Overvi~ -
Accounting Principles, Information Systems, & Industry Operating Procedures, IRS, available 
at http://www.irs.govlBusinesseslFood-Industry-Overview---Accounting-Principles,-Informa 
tion-Systems,-&-Industry-Operating-Procedures (last updated Mar. 5, 2014) ("Four tip 
reporting programs are available for these taxpayers to enter into with the Service. Two of these 
pro fonna documents are titled Tip Reporting Alternative Commitment (TRAC) and Tip Rate 
Determination Agreements (TRDA). The IRS developed the Employer Designed Tip Reporting 
Alternative Commitment (EmTRAC) Agreement program in response to employers in the food 
and beverage industry who expressed an interest in designing their own TRAC programs. 
Attributed Tip Income Program (ATIP) is a new three-year pilot program for food and 
beverage employers. The first annual basis begins January 1,2007. Details and requirements 
for participation for employers and employees are available in Revenue Procedure 2006-30. 
The agreements serve a dual purpose: improving compliance oftipped employees and avoiding 
tip examinations. The TRAC agreement is by far the more popular with large and rnidsized 
taxpayers. It can be obtained at: www.irs.govlBusinesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-Employ 
edIVoluntary-Compliance-Agreements---Restaurant-Tax-Tips. "); Reporting Tip Income-
Restaurant Tax Tips, IRS, available at http://www.irs.govlBusinesses/Small-Businesses-&-
Self-EmployedIReporting-Tip-Income-Restaurant-Tax-Tips (last updated Feb. 27,2014); see 
also PUBLICATION 531: REpORTING TIp INCOME, IRS (2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/ 
publications/p5311ar02.htrnl (advice on keeping a daily tip record). 
130 Joulfaian, supra note 99, at 212. 
131 See American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. 112-240, 126 Stat. 2313, 
§ IOI(c)(l) (Jan. 2, 2013) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 2001 (c)); DODGE, GERZOG & 
CRAWFORD, supra note I, at 32-33. 
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heirs would be reduced. This proposal is not equivalent to the impact of a 
CIT, which is better correlated with family size;\32 however, it may 
correlate acceptably with lower income tax bracket beneficiaries. 
The CIT proposal seeks to provide an incentive for the rich "to share 
further wealth transfers with individuals who have fewer opportunities than 
their children.,,\33 Yet, few donors or decedents would alter the recigients of 
their noncharitable gift-giving in a statistically significant way. 34 Most 
taxpayers with children give their assets to those children,135 that pattern is 
unlikely to change despite the tax benefits the CIT would promote.136 
Moreover, there are more direct ways to encourage that behavior. For 
example, Congress could restrict charitable deductions to those programs of 
exempt organizations that predominantly aid the poor (feeding, clothing, 
providing scholarships, subsidizing educational programs, etc.), or could 
provide increased tax benefits for those particular charitable transfers.137 
Professor Batchelder intends for the CIT to correct the poor public 
image of the estate tax as the "death tax," a term coined in a successful 
campaign launched by opponents "who have framed the estate tax as a 
double tax on frugal, hard-working donors who are ruthlessly taxed right at 
132 See Hines, supra note 52 at 190-9l. 
133 
Batchelder, supra note 7, at 3; see Ann Mumford, From Dahomey to London to DC: 
"Marketing" Wealth with the Proposal for a Comprehensive Inheritance Tax, 63 TAX L. 
REv. 221, 234 (2009). Mumford cites this incentive among others of the CIT's positive 
responses to the negative death tax hype: "The comprehensive inheritance tax includes a 
clear response to death tax imagery by targeting the behavior of the donor before death." Id 
134 See Aron-Dine, supra note 6, at 266. Former policy analyst Ariva Aron-Dine is also 
skeptical of that result: 
Id. 
135 
Realistically, it does not seem to me that the proposal will lead wealthy 
decedents to split their estates into, say, $500,000 bequests to each of 
twenty needy, or even middle-income, people. Rather, what the proposal 
seems more likely to do is to encourage splitting large estates into $2 
million bequests to a somewhat larger number of reasonably well-off 
people. 
See Kaplow, supra note 9, at 175. 
136 See Richard Schmalbeck,Avoiding Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes, in RETHINKING 
ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION, supra note 126, at 113, 121-22 (concluding, persuasively, that 
even with the great tax benefit ofthe annual exclusion, few wealthy taxpayers currently are 
influenced to make those lifetime transfers because "the real barrier to full use of the annual 
exclusion is the strong preference of potential donors for the retention of economic power"). 
137 See, for example, section 170(b) which lists percentage limitations on the income 
tax charitable deduction for lifetime charitable gifts. 
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the moment of death.,,138 She intends the CIT to "improve public 
understanding of the taxation of wealth transfers.,,139 But, a new spin is 
always in the wings to combat reasoned arguments. While the CIT focuses 
on the wealthy windfall recipients, it is not too much of a leap to believe 
that CIT opponents would frame the CIT in similar terms: that is, double 
taxation of those hard-earned dollars passing from a caring parent to his 
grieving loved ones. Instituting a new complex tax system is not the answer 
to powerful and contagious political rhetoric. Proponents need to develop a 
more effective message or to create a better counterspin. 
Finally, one of the central reasons that makes the present estate tax 
preferable to an inheritance tax, including the CIT, is that the current 
transfer tax system deals well with inter vivos transfers with retained 
powers. Professor Batchelder states that the CIT would likely rely on the 
transfer tax definition of when a gift is complete.140 However, the gift-
completion rules differ in some important ways from the estate tax inclusion 
statutes so it is unclear what principles would apply.141 Current estate tax 
sections 2036 and 2038 anticipate and counter much potential abusive 
avoidance techniques involving retained control. 142 Essentially, although 
they need reform, the current transfer taxes tax inherited wealth pretty well, 
determining what and when transfers should be taxed. While transfer tax 
reforms are needed,143 we would have more avoidance and abuse with either 
138 
Batchelder, supra note 7, at 3. 
139 Id. 
140 See id. at 65 (emphasis added) ("Despite this fundamental change in the form of 
wealth transfer taxation, the proposal would continue to rely on much ofthe extensive body 
oflaws, regulations, and guidance that have been developed under the U.S. estate tax system. 
For example, the existing rules governing when a transfer has occurred, how it is valued, 
and what transfers are taxable would remain unchanged. The proposal would not tax a large 
portion of wealth transfers, as under current law."). 
141 For example, the gift tax regulations consider a gift complete when a donor retains 
power to determine when the beneficiary will receive the property-"the manner or time of 
enjoyrnent"-but the estate tax statute would include property subject to such powers in the 
decedent's estate. Treas. Reg. § 25.251l-2(d); see also Lober v. United States, 346 U.S. 335 
(1953). Likewise, the gift tax regulations incorporate the concept of a substantial adverse 
interest to allow a completed gift for joint powers despite the opposite estate tax rule stating 
that section 2038(a)(2) applies to joint powers regardless ofa co-holder's substantial adverse 
interest. See Treas. Reg. § 5.2511-2(e); see also Helvering v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 
296 U.S. 85 (1935). 
142 See supra notes 55-66 and accompanying text. 
143 
See Wendy C. Gerzog, From the Greedy to the Needy, supra note 90, at 1133; 
Wendy C. Gerzog, Not all Defined Value Clauses Are Equal, 10 Pm TAX REv. I (2012); 
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an income-inclusion method or the CIT than we have now. Because each 
donee has different economic means, those advocating for an inheritance 
tax consider taxing the donee as more accurately reflecting ability to pay. 144 
However, because that integral part of an inheritance tax is also subject to 
abuse,145 family attribution rules are one suggested option to include within 
a CIT or any other inheritance tax to deal with that issue. 146 
IV. BEHAVIOR 
Scholars have noted both a lack of consistent motives with respect to 
gifts in the current transfer tax system and a "substantial variation in 
behavior among estate taxpayers. ,,147 They have found more estate planning 
when a decedent had a long illness before his or her death,148 but even the 
very old do not often opt to divest themselves of their holdings. 149 The data 
"provides support for the notion that there are important barriers to tax 
avoidance, perhaps related to the undesirability of giving up control over 
assets.,,150 In general, however, avoidance behavior is not predictable 
because of the differences among those subject to the estate tax-both 
different behaviors among wealthy individuals in general and different 
behaviors among wealthy individuals at various points in their lives. 
Particularly for the wealthiest of those subject to transfer taxes, 
taxpayers are more unwilling to devolve themselves of their control of 
Reforming Charitable Split-Interest Rules, supra note 90; Wendy C. Gerzog, Valuation 
Discounting Techniques: Terms Gone Awry, supra note 19, at 775; Kopczuk, supra note 43, 
at 154--55. This author has suggested reforms on such abusive estate planning devices as 
family limited partnerships and charitable lead annuity trusts. 
144 See 2008 JOINT COMMITTEE PRINT, I 10TH CONGo 19 (Comm. Print), available at 
https:llwww.jct.gov/publications.html?func=fiIeinfo&id=1318. 
145 See Udell, supra note 7, at 217 ("An inheritance tax, with a generous individual 
exemption can create significant horizontal equity distortions under these provisions for 
equal size businesses inherited by families of different sizes."). 
146 See 2008 JOINT COMMITTEE PRINT, I 10TH CONGo at 23 n.70, citing Task Force on 
Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes, Report on Reform of Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes, A.B.A. 
§ 17, at 99-101 (2004). 
147 
Kopczuk, supra note 43, at 157. 
148 See id. at 155-56. 
149 See id. at 156 ("[E]states are growing with age even among the very elderly, further 
underscoring that avoidance is not always pursued in advance."). 
150 Id. This finding about behavior also underlines the importance of sections 2036 and 
2038 and their role in preventing erosion of the estate tax. 
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assets than of their legal ownership those assets. 151 While making annual 
exclusion gifts is an easy way to reduce a decedent's transfer tax 
liabilities,152 as Professor Schmalbeck has shown, the wealthy often do not 
make those gifts: "In the aggregate, it is estimated that, at most, only about 
15 percent of the value of the annual exclusion gifts that could be made tax 
free from potentially taxable estates are in fact made.,,153 His explanations 
for this underutilization include a work disincentive for young donees, 
retention of control over children's behavior and choices, and, for those 
close to the exemption amount, retention of sufficient assets to cover the 
taxpayer's own medical or other unanticipated lifetime needs. 154 
That last motivation was particularly evident in the fall of 2012 when 
estate planners, anticipating a possible return to 2001 Act sunset levels or at 
least a reduction of the currently available high exemption amounts, were 
urging their clients to take advantage of the 2012 $5.12 million per-person 
aggregate transfer tax exemption. 155 The motives Professor Schmalbeck 
described may correlate with the experience of the recent economic downturn 
when assets declined sharply in value. That combination made even very 
wealthy taxpayers apprehensive that they would not have enough assets to 
sustain their desired standard ofliving. 156 Statistics showed that "[ f]ewer than 
10 percent of clients with at least $10 million have used even part of the 
exemption or plan to by December, said two-thirds of certified public 
accountants surveyed by the American Institute ofCPAs.,,157 
Professor Schmalbeck's rationale is meritorious in that much of what 
motivates behavior under the current transfer tax system is that most estate 
planning requires the donor to relinquish control of the transferred property, 
151 
See Schmalbeck, supra note 136. 
152 See id. 
153 I d. at 121 (citation omitted). 
154 See id. 
155 See Collins, supra note 54. 
156 See id. 
157 These figures were based on statistical information from financial planners and 227 
accountants. See id. Polls dealing with charitable donations are another example of the 
wealthy'S lower sensitivity to tax incentives. See Robert Frank, Why the Obama Tax Hikes 
Won't Kill Charity, WALL ST. 1. BLOG (Mar. 4, 2009, 3:28PM) blogs.wsj.com/wealthJ2009/ 
03/04/why-the-obama-tax-hikes-wont-kill-charity/ ("[Bank of America] and the Center on 
Philanthropy at Indiana University polled 700 households with net worths of at least $1 million 
and incomes of $200,000, which now counts as 'Obama rich.' ... So only 10% of the rich 
would cut off their contributions-and that is only if deductions went to zero. President Obama 
is proposing to reduce the deduction for top-income households to 28% from 35%."). 
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and that the wealthy prefer not to do that. 158 Again, that is why sections 
2036 and 2038 are so important to retain and that is one reason, besides 
inherently greater administrative ease and higher compliance levels, for 
retaining both the focus on the donor or the decedent and the current 
transfer tax system. 
A former policy analyst at the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 159 
Aviva Aron-Dine argues that an annual wealth tax would discourage 
savings more than a wealth transfer tax that is imposed at the decedent's 
death. She bases that conclusion on the observation that "very rich people 
appear to accumulate wealth in large part because they want to be richer, 
rather than because they want to spend a lot of money or leave a lot of 
money to their chi1dren.,,160 
Moreover, some of the wealthy do opt for estate tax avoidance or 
reduction planning. While currently the maj ority of the wealthy divide their 
assets equally,161 whether they would continue to do so in a CIT system or 
whether they would change that pattern to create after-tax equal divisions is 
unclear; if the latter, David Jou1faian posits whether that would undermine 
the adoption of the CIT. 162 Jou1faian also sees the potential for more 
bequests to foreign beneficiaries who would not be subject to the tax, 
concluding that fractional interest discounts would increase. 163 Thus, he 
concludes that the effect of the CIT would likely be to multiply 
"opportunities for tax avoidance and noncomp1iance."I64 
158 
See also Kopczuk, supra note 43, at 154. 
159 See Aron-Dine, supra note 6, at 265 n.al. 
160 Id. at 268. Moreover, Aron-Dine agrees with Professor Batchelder's notion that 
transfer taxes should be a way of taxing nonmonetary advantages that wealthy parents 
transfer to their children in the form of, for example, employment or educational 
opportunities. See id. at 267. Those benefits better correspond with a decedent's wealth than 
with the monetary inheritance of each of the decedent's children. See id. 
161 See Hines, supra note 52, at 191 ("As an empirical matter, even under estate 
taxation families generally divide their estates equally among surviving children."). 
162 See loulfaian, supra note 99, at 211. loulfaian notes several behavioral changes in 
taxpayers' reactions to the enactments of the GST tax and the unlimited marital deduction. 
See id. at 211-12. 
163 See id. at 212. 
164 Id. 
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v. WHAT A FEDERAL INHERITANCE TAX OFFERS A TRANSFER 
TAX 
The primary benefit of an inheritance system is its timing of taxation 
upon receipt by the donee or beneficiary; such timing thereby eliminates the 
current reliance on actuarial tables l65 to determine the value of a split 
interest in property such as a remainder interest. 166 By matching the timing 
of the tax to the real transfer time, the inheritance system allows the tax 
consequences to reflect accurately the values ofthose gratuitous transfers. 
For example, the distortions and abuse of charitable split-interest trusts stem 
from the inherent flaws of valuing an interest by means of the actuarial 
tables at the time of the creation of the trust instead of when the charity or 
noncharitable beneficiary actually receives the property. 167 
The advantage of the actuarial tables is their simplicity and established 
acceptance. Yet, they do not and cannot reflect a real future value. No one 
has a crystal ball about future value, and the assumptions in the tables are 
inherently flawed. The actuarial tables assume a fixed rate of growth based 
on current interest rates, which at any time-but particularly when interest 
rates are low-are unlikely to be accurate in the long run. The tables rely on 
unreal assumptions, like the supposition that today's interest rate is relevant 
to the eventual payout of a particular investment, and they ignore the 
principal's actual growth during the term. Likewise, when an interest's 
duration is based on an individual's life instead of a term of years, the 
actuarial tables employ mortality assumptions that will often change during 
the term of the interest. 168 
Most pointedly, the taxpayer is the ultimate decisionmaker in choosing 
if and when to use an estate planning technique that employs the actuarial 
165 Annuities and other partial interests in property, such as remainders, must be valued 
by the actuarial tables. See LR.C. § 7520. Even before that statute's enactment in 1988 by 
section 5031(a) of Public Law 100-647, the regulations dealing with estate and gift tax 
valuation indicated their usage. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7(c) (indicating the applicable 
regulation and tables for valuing interests in a decedent's estate from before January 1, 1952 
to the present date); see also LR.C. § 25.2512-7(c) (instructing a parallel valuation for gift 
tax purposes). 
166 See Batchelder, supra note 7, at 65 ("Rather than following the current approach, the 
proposal would apply an approach developed by William Andrews and wait to see who gets 
what before taxing transfers for which the taxable status ofthe beneficiary is unclear. "); see 
also 2008 JOINT COMMITTEE PRINT, I 10TH CONGo at 21-24 (Comm. Print), available at 
https:llwww.jct.gov/publications.html?func=fiIeinfo&id=1318. 
167 See Reforming Charitable Split-Interest Rules, supra note 90, at 880-82. 
168 
See DODGE, GERZOG & CRAWFORD, supra note I, at 114-16. 
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tables. Thus, while the actuarial tables may be theoretically neutral, they are 
in fact only used when their valuation assumptions are very likely to benefit 
the taxpayer. 169 
Thus, an inheritance tax system that taxes gratuitous transfers to a 
beneficiary on the actual receipt of the property does not need to rely on 
guesswork (that is, the actuarial tables) and therefore minimizes gaming in 
this area. At the same time, reforms of the current transfer tax system could 
curtail those abuses. 170 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Although an inheritance tax could ignore the relationship between a 
transferor and transferee, existing inheritance taxes base exemptions or rates 
on this feature. To that extent, existing inheritance systems inequitably tax 
the recipient based on the closeness of his or her relationship to the donor or 
decedent. Rewarding or punishing a relationship status between the 
transferor and transferee is neither a good measure of ability to pay nor an 
effective means of wealth redistribution. 
Likewise, inheritance tax systems could tax lifetime gifts; however, those 
in the United States do not do so, and accordingly, lack the back-up of a gift 
tax. But, eliminating gifts from an inheritance tax favors the wealthiest of 
individuals who can best afford to make earlier-in-life transfers. 
Most significantly, and characteristic of any inheritance tax or an 
income-inclusion model, is the focus on the recipient of a gratuitous transfer 
instead of on the transferor. Therefore, except when the transferor transfers 
all of his or her property to one individual, the major flaw in instituting a 
federal inheritance tax is its multiplication of individuals subject to the tax, 
which in tum magnifies administrative costs and decreases compliance 
rates. This escalation of returns results in a lifetime of unreported cash and 
untracked property transfers among family members. Taking a lesson from 
the unreported tip income ofrestaurant employees (both from its history of 
169 See 2008 Hearings on Alternatives, supra note 1, at 81 (statement of Professor 
Joseph M. Dodge) ("Actuarial tables are not only inaccurate in individual cases, but can be 
'gamed' by such devices as GRA Ts and private annuities."). 
170 See Reforming Charitable Split-Interest Rules, supra note 90, at 880-82. While the 
goal of estate administration is to expeditiously settle the estate, the current transfer-tax 
system already employs limited recapture rules and long-term payment options that do not 
interfere with that aim. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 2032A (providing for recapture when, during the 
10 years following a decedent's death, qualified heirs stop using the qualified real property 
for a qualified purpose like farming); LR.C. § 6166 (providing for the beneficial interest and 
estate tax installment-payment rules that cover a IS-year period). 
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abuse and complicated reporting requirements) a federal inheritance tax 
system would be virtually impossible to police, increase administrative 
complexity, and create a debacle of such large proportions that it would be 
even more hated than the current transfer tax system. Increasing the number 
of taxpayers subject to a death triggered tax would greatly undermine 
enforcement of such a tax. 
Professor Batchelder's CIT proposal eliminates the disparity of burdens 
for some beneficiaries under the current transfer tax system. It also solves 
the problems of timing and valuation abuses that involve the actuarial 
tables. However, the CIT engenders its own problems: increased inequity 
(tax rates based on the lack of or more distant relationship between the 
donor or decedent and his or her beneficiary); increased family wealth 
concentration (families with more than one recipient having an increased 
total exemption); increased valuation abuse (increased fractional interest 
discounts); increased recordkeeping costs (including those taxpayers who 
cannot know whether they will reach and exceed the exemption level at 
some time in the future); increased compliance problems (due to the 
increased numbers subject to the tax); and increased complexity (relying 
heavily on, but sometimes changing, the current transfer tax terminology 
and principles, the CIT's rate surcharge, and its immersion into the federal 
income tax system). 
Essentially, the transfer tax system works relatively well171 and has 
significant practical and theoretical advantages over a federal inheritance 
tax or a CIT. 
171 By means of its very large exemption (applicable exclusion amount), the transfer taxes 
collect revenue only from the property transfers of the very wealthiest of individuals. See 2008 
Hearings on Alternatives, supra note 1, at 29-30 fig. 3 (statement of Professor Lily Batchelder) 
("The estate tax system has been a small but stable source of revenue ever since the estate tax 
was enacted in 1916, generally raising between 1 and 2.5 percent of federal revenues as 
illustrated in Figure 3 .... In 2007, the estate tax system raised about $26 billion."). In 2008, 
$24,870,000 was collected in estate taxes and $2,843,000, in gift taxes. See STAFF OF 1. COMM. 
ON TAXA nON, MODELING THE FEDERAL REVENUE EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN ESTATE AND GIFT 
TAXA nON, JCX-76-12, at 15-16 tbls.3--4 (2012), available at https:llwww.jct.gov/publications. 
html?func=startdown&id=4492; Barnes, supra note 36; What's New-Estate and Gift Tax, 
supra note 40. 
